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LEGAL CASES ON POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND
POSTHUMOUS PRIVACY: HISTORY CENSORSHIP,
LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE
Dr. Bo Zhao
"One's good name determines the manner in which one perceives
oneself and how one's peers and society relate to one. In effect, the
only asset of many people, both public servants and those working in
the private sector, is their reputation, which they cherish as life itself.
This applies to both the living and the dead. We must protect the
dignity of the deceased and their good name." 1
"The dead have no rights, and they suffer no wrongs." 2

CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................... 40
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 41
II. POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND HISTORY
CENSORSHIP ............................................................................ 45
t Faculty of Law; University of Groningen, The Netherlands. This article is based on my
research report, Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy in History
Censorship, which was presented at the Seminar on Censorship of History: Law, Education
and Archives, held on the 14th of Oct., 2013 at the University of Groningen, the
Netherlands. Special thanks to Prof. Antoon De Baets for his help in case collection and
generous permission to access his case database, as well as his numerous valuable
suggestions. My gratitude to Prof. Ray Madoff (Boston College Law School) for being my
commentator at the seminar and her precious remarks, as well as to Prof. Jeanne Mifusud
Bonnici (University of Groningen) for her inspirations and insights as my second
commentator. Also my appreciation to my colleagues Ms. Anja Hansen and Mr. Jan
Blaauw at Groningen, as well as to other seminar participants for their various comments
and suggestions, including Prof. Theo Thomassen (University of Amsterdam), Prof. Kaat
Wits (University of Leuven) and Dr. Procter (University of Leeds). More importantly, it is
not possible for this paper to take shape without the support of The Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) of the research project Legal Cases on
Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy. Finally, I want to express my gratitude to
the anonymous journal editors for their excellent editorial work and certainly all faults
remain my own.
1. HCJ 6126/94 Szenes v. Broadcasting Authority 53(3) PD 817 [1999] (Isr.).
2. James Stephen, Libels on the Dead, in 11 VA. L.J. 260, 261 (James C. Lamb ed.,
vol. 11 1887).

Published by SURFACE, 2014

1

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 4

40

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 42:1

A. Reputation and Posthumous Reputation ................................ 45
B. Posthumous Reputation and History Censorship .................. 48
III. THE LEGAL APPARATUSES FOR PROTECTION .................... 53

A. Blasphemy Law, Insult Law and Sedition Law ...................... 53
B. Defamation Law ..................................................................... 55
C. Privacy Law and Others ........................................................ 58
D. Memory Law and Oblivion Law ............................................ 60
IV. LEGAL CASES ON POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND
PRIVACY ................................................................................... 63

A. Posthumous Reputation and Collective Memory ................... 63
B. Political Figures and History Controversies ......................... 67
C. Rehabilitation and Posthumous Justice ................................. 71
D. Posthumous Privacy and Individual Dignity ......................... 74
E. Biography Writing and Posthumous Disputes ....................... 78
F. Religious Honor and Group Identity ..................................... 82

G. Holocaust Deniers and Revisionists ...................................... 85
H Immortality in the Information Age ....................................... 90
V. FREE SPEECH AND HISTORY CENSORSHIP ........................... 92

A. International Standards ......................................................... 92
B. Historical Truth or Judicial Truth ......................................... 95
C. The Icons ofHistory Censorship ........................................... 97
D. A Threat from Law or to Law? ............................................ 105
VI. LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE ............................................ 107

A. Politics and Law .................................................................. 108
B. Law and Culture .................................................................. 113
VII. CONCLUSION: DEAD BUT NOT FARAWAY ..................... 120

ABSTRACT
It is a well-established doctrine in common law countries that law
does not protect the reputation and privacy of the deceased. However,
many countries, including W estem European democracies, protect them
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/4
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to various extents by confining free expression and exchange of
information and ideas regarding the dead and the past. Such an
instrumental use of defamation law and privacy law can provide
censorship of history with justifiable legal grounds. Based on an
analysis of representative legal cases on posthumous reputation and
posthumous privacy collected across the world, this article tries to offer
a thorough analysis of the phenomenon of how legal protection of
posthumous reputation and privacy can be used to carry out censorship
of history.
After a brief introduction, Section II will explain the concepts of
posthumous reputation and posthumous privacy and their relationship
with history censorship in theory, so that it is clear why history
censorship can be achieved via protection of the two posthumous
interests. Section III will briefly discuss the related legal apparatuses
that can be used to protect the deceased's reputation and privacy in
different jurisdictions, whose abuse or misuse may lead to history
censorship. Section IV will classify the collected legal cases on
posthumous reputation and privacy into eight categories and discuss the
circumstances of history censorship in each category. Section V will
deepen the case analysis by illustrating the international criteria of free
speech right protection, defining the icons of history censorship,
explaining the dilemma between historical truth and judicial truth
confronted by judges, and clarifying the negative impacts on law itself.
Section VI will further explore the interactions among law, politics and
culture, which may account for the differentiated legal treatments of the
two posthumous interests in different jurisdictions.
The article
concludes with an invitation to re-consider the law's role in resolving
posthumous defamation and privacy controversies when historical
narratives are involved, and proposes how to achieve better decisions in
future cases.

I. INTRODUCTION

In Responsible History, Antoon De Baets drew a vivid scenario of
how history censorship can be achieved in three effective ways. They
are control of history archives, censorship of school history textbooks,
and legal protection of the dead's reputation and privacy. 3 According to

3. See ANTOON DEBAETS, RESPONSIBLE HISTORY 14 (2008) (explaining censorship of
history is a category of abuse of history, which in more abstract sense, according to De
Baets, is "the use of history with intent to deceive"); MARGARET MACMILLAN, THE USES
AND ABUSES OF HISTORY xiii (Profile Books Ltd. 2010)(2008) (explaining that the abuse of
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the author, defamation law functions, in particular, "as disguised
instruments of censorship,"4 creating "a chilling effect on the expression
and exchange of historical information and ideas. " 5 This is well
observed in the author's detailed analysis of twenty-two legal cases on
posthumous defamation and privacy invasion collected from eight
Western European countries from 1965 to 2000. 6
Beyond these legal cases and across the world, posthumous
reputation and posthumous privacy under many circumstances are never
simple or trivial issues, as they seem to be at first sight. To regard the
two in such a way is both naive and a blind denial of the complexity of
communal life. In reality, they involve too many other important issues
beyond merely the dignity and respect of the deceased, ranging from
collective memory, family repute and honor, monetary interests, group
honor, national identity, religious dignity, diplomatic controversies,
posthumous justice of war crime victims, biography writing, history
controversies, free expression rights, euthanasia, etc. They do matter,
especially for many communities where legal cases on reputation and
privacy of the deceased have been brought before courts for resolution
on the following grounds.
First, families of the deceased usually care not only about the
dead's reputation and privacy, but also more about their own reputation
or honor and privacy affiliated with the dead' s, not even mentioning the
economic interests in connection with the deceased' s names, which is
particularly true in the case of dead public celebrities. Family members
thus are the most strongly motivated protectors of the deceased's
reputation and privacy. Second, people like close friends, colleagues or
even unknown strangers who enjoyed benevolence and friendship of the
deceased, admired their past achievements, or shared similar beliefs and
memories with the deceased, or those who once participated in and
supported joint projects, may all defend the deceased's reputation and
honor to various extents against destruction of such goodness that they
cherish in life. Furthermore, when leading politicians, national heroes
(or heroines), military or religious martyrs, and public celebrities are
affiliated with collective honor or reputation of a social, religious or
political group, their reputations will not be only a personal or family
issue, but rather a constituent of group honor and identity. Their

history is defined as for the purposes of "creating one-sided or false histories to justify
treating others badly, seizing their land, for example, or killing them.").
4. See DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 3.
5. See id. at 90.
6. See id. at 3.
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reputation will be under close monitoring and protection of the social
group, or even political state.
Lastly and most importantly, the protection of posthumous
reputation and privacy depends eventually on how a society treats the
deceased in general. If a society treats them seriously with considerable
respect, dignity, and authority, and the society is willing to follow the
traditions and conventions well established in communal life, it will
have stronger protection of posthumous interests, including reputation
and privacy of the dead. In general, a society with an individualist
nature prefers less protection of the dead than one of communal nature.
Moreover, moving from morality to legality, while common law
countries in general firmly deny protection of posthumous reputation
and privacy, this is not the case in other countries. For instance, in
Germany, France, Malta, China, Israel, Taiwan, and Spain, the
deceased' s reputation and privacy are protected under the fundamental
right to human dignity, or under more general rules protecting leaders of
political state, or under memory laws, etc. Other countries, like
Thailand and Turkey, even have specific regulations forbidding
defamation of dead monarchs and political leaders. Albeit being taken
as fundamental to democracy, free speech does not always win the
battle against reputation and privacy - including those of the dead even in democracies such as Germany and France. While protection is
the case, how such laws balance the two posthumous interests with the
right of free speech, and what make up the boundaries of protection
deserve more detailed analysis. Though such legal practices and the
underlying rationales seem eccentric to common law lawyers, they can
be well explained and justified in specific political-social contexts.
In light of this, a discussion of the above issues will help illustrate
the fact that while law has its own internal morality and logic, 7 it can
never be separated from specific political contexts, social ethos, and
cultural backgrounds. It makes sense to analyze the related various
legal apparatuses for protecting posthumous reputation and privacy,
ranging from traditional blasphemy law, insult law and sedition law, to
defamation law and privacy law, and to modem memory law and
oblivion law. In explaining and comparing different approaches to
posthumous reputation and privacy across the world, what is well
observed in legal development is a general tendency shifting from
privileged protection of reputation and privacy of the nobles and
aristocrats, to more equal protection of ordinary people, from protection
of the collective and political state, to more liberal protection of
7. See generally LON L. FULLER,
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individuals.
Following De Baets' initiative, this paper intends to bring his
research of legal protection of posthumous reputation and privacy in
history censorship a step further in three directions. First, it will
broaden his analysis beyond Western Europe by analyzing more
representative legal cases collected from across the world. Second, it
will provide a more structured analysis of the law's potential role and
various mechanisms in implementing history censorship via protecting
posthumous reputation and privacy, as well as the accompanied
problems. It will also explain the political and cultural backgrounds
that have shaped the use of law for this purpose. Third, this paper will
offer a more thorough explanation of the phenomenon by engaging in
theoretical discussion of posthumous reputation and privacy and their
general role in the social order. Thus, this paper is both analytical and
descriptive, both theoretical and practical, with the main purpose to
offer a thorough analysis of how legal protection of the deceased's
reputation and privacy can be used to restrict free speech and achieve
history censorship.
Section II will explain the concepts of posthumous reputation and
posthumous privacy and their relationship with history censorship in
theory, so that it is clear why history censorship can be achieved by
protection of the two posthumous interests. Section III discusses the
legal apparatuses that can be manipulated to protect the deceased' s
reputation and privacy in law development, whose abuse or misuse may
lead to history censorship to different extents. Section IV will classify
the collected legal cases on posthumous reputation and privacy into
eight categories and discuss the circumstances of history censorship in
each category. Section V will deepen the case analysis by discussing
regional and international criteria of free speech right protection,
defining the icons of history censorship in such legal cases, illustrating
the dilemma confronted by judges between historical truth and judicial
truth, and explaining the negative impacts on law itself. Section VI will
further explore the interactions of law, politics and culture, which can
account for the differentiated legal treatments of the two posthumous
interests in different jurisdictions. It concludes with an invitation to reconsider law's role in resolving posthumous defamation controversies
when history narratives are involved, proposing how related history
controversies should be resolved in the future.
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II. POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND HISTORY CENSORSHIP

A. Reputation and Posthumous Reputation

An individual's reputation is the societal-moral judgment of the
person based on facts considered to be relevant by a community; such
facts include personal acts and characteristics, and these judgments are
based on certain moral standards of that community. 8 Reputation lies in
reputational networks of various agents including friends, family
members, colleagues, and all those who know a particular agent, even
those who only read about the person but never meet him or her, or
friends' friends. 9 Reputation is important to a community in terms of
mutual trust and cooperation formation, mutual treatment, social
learning, social control etc. 10 According to Robert Post, reputation can
be understood as personal honor, indicating an individual's social status
in a community, as intangible property consequent to personal
achievements, and as human dignity based on equal respect. 11
Reputation is a concept related to, or somewhat overlapped with
other concepts such as honor, dignity, respect, privacy, and personal
identity in general. An important aspect of reputation is identity.
Identity comes into being usually when a sort of reputation of an
individual or a social group becomes strong enough for one to be
distinguished from others. Therefore reputation is vital to identity
formation in individual life. Privacy as information control also plays a
role in identity formation in individual life. 12 In particular, reputation
and privacy cannot be separated from each other since both are effective
means of personal information management and personal boundary
control. 13
8. See LAWRENCE McNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 21 - 22 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2007).
9. See KENNETH H. CRAIK, REPUTATION: A NETWORK INTERPRETATION 6-9 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2009) (noting in Craik's terms, social networks and "the outer tires").
10. JOHN WHITFIELD, PEOPLE WILL TALK: THE SURPRISING SCIENCE OF REPUTATION 7,
64, 102, 121 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2011 ).
11. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 700 (1986); see also JAMES BOWMAN, HONOR: A
HISTORY (Encounter Books 2007) (explaining a more detailed discussion of honour history
and culture developments).
12. See, e.g., Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy and Identity, in PRIVACY AND THE
CRIMINAL LA w 43 (Erik Claes et al. eds., 2006); Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal
Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. Rev. 371 (2011); Clare Sullivan,
Privacy or Identity?, 2 INT'L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 289 (2008); Lisa M. Austin, Privacy,
Shame and the Anxieties of Identity (Jan. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=2061748 (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
13. See generally Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & Pub. AFF. 3
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Plainly, they are just two opposite presentations of one's self. 14 In
many cases, disclosure of private matters that deviate from commonly
accepted social morals, 15 can harm reputation, 16 even if such disclosure
is true, as seen in common law torts of public disclosure of private
issues and false light. 17 "Still, some invasion of privacy causes of
action," according to Iryami, "do primarily involve loss of reputation
and may inevitably lead themselves into defamation action." 18
Reputation and privacy are closely affiliated with each other in that both
are crucial components of human dignity, protected by constitutions and
international treaties as fundamental human rights. Under the European
Convention of Human Rights ("Convention"), a right of reputation is a
right derived from Article 8, which prescribes the protection of family
life or private life, or the right to privacy. 19

(1998).
14. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(Anchor 1959) (explaining the external self and internal self).
15. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1
(1978); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1977) (arguing
privacy is meant for personal secrecy that shall not be protected by law in general since it
increases costs of market exchanges).
16. A telling example is the American Steinbuch case in which Steinbuch's graphic
bed stories were disclosed by his ex- girlfriend Jessica Cutler in her blog and publicized on
the Internet before millions of people. Steinbuch sued for invasion of privacy, which
damaged his reputation meanwhile. See Steinbuch v. Cutler, 463 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C.
2006).
17. See ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 103- 29 (Thomson West 2007).
Disclosure of private matters and false lights are two of the major aspects of privacy
invasion according to Prosser; the other two are appropriation of images and the like, and
the trespass of private spheres. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389
(1960).
18. Raymond Iryami, Give the Dead Their Day in Court: Implying a Private Cause of
Action for Defamation of the Dead from Criminal Libel Statues, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2006).
19. Since Chauvy v. France, the right to reputation has been gradually established by
the Eur. Ct. H.R. under Article 8, which was followed in its sequent rulings. See Pfeifer v.
Austria, App. No. 12556/03, para 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 15, 2008), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["12556/03"],"itemid":["OO
1-83294"]} (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); see White v. Sweden, App. No. 42435/02, para. 26
available
at
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
Sept.
19,
2006),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-76894 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014). The judgment was followed and strengthened later. White, App. No. 42435/02,
para. 26. In the most recent Lindon v. France, for instance, Judge Loucaides in his
concurring opinion criticized the over protection of freedom of speech in past cases by the
Court and expressed the right to reputation should always be considered as safeguarded by
Article 8, "as part and parcel of the right to respect for one's private life." Lindon v. France,
App. Nos. 21279/02, 36448/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2007), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-82846 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
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Posthumous reputation, by analogy, is the social evaluation and
Plainly,
assessment of the deceased's acts and characteristics.
posthumous reputation is what we think about the dead and their past
acts. Our reputations "outlive us," Whitfield noted, "advancing or
damaging our interests[, just as they did during our lives, for instance,]
influencing the way people treat our children." 20 Posthumous
defamation accordingly refers to the communications or expressions
that bring disrepute or dishonor to the deceased, degrading their social
status, or making others think less of them. Posthumous reputation has
been used to support the concept of posthumous harm in philosophical
debates. 21 According to the proponents, the deceased's reputation could
be damaged. 22 However, the philosophical arguments of posthumous
harm is apparently not enough to provide a justification for legal
protection in Westem democracies, unless the dead occupy a special
status so that their reputations must be protected for other reasons like
social ordering or public order. 23
After death, one's reputation in general will diminish or disappear
gradually, as his or her reputational networks become weakened,
information regarding the dead stops disseminating, and less and less
people know the deceased. In certain circumstances, however, the
deceased's reputation could grow even stronger. 24 Similar to the living,
the dead's reputation closely relates to concepts of privacy, honor,
respect, and dignity. For instance, the disclosure of the deceased's
private issues can alter their posthumous reputations in significant ways,
in particular, the reputations of public figures and celebrities. 25 When
we discuss posthumous reputation and the related legal issues, those
20. WHITFIELD, supra note 11, at 7.
21. See generally DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 15- 23 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (discussing the philosophical debate of
posthumous harm); JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 53, 126, 160, 17983 (Stanford Univ. Press 1993).
22. See Joel Feinberg, The Rights ofAnimals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43, 57-60 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974); 1 JOEL FEINBERG,
Harm to Others, in THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 79-82 (Oxford Univ. Press
1984).
23. See generally infra Section VI.B.
24. For instance, through biography and "the chorus of survivors", the deceased may
be known by more people than before their death. See CRAIK, supra note 10, at 173-99.
25. A more recent example is the swift of the public attitudes to Jimmy Savile, the
famous British entertainer, after the posthumous disclosure of his sexual abuse cases. See
Savile Abuse Claims: BBC Must 'Command Credibility', BBC NEWS (last updated Oct. 8,
2012, 11: 13 PM), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-south-east-walesl 9878433 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); see generally Bo Zhao, Public Figures and Their
Posthumous Reputation, 59-60 STORIA DELLA STORIOGRAFIA 87 (2011) (discussing public
figures posthumuous reputation).
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concepts are usually mentioned in plaintiffs' complaints and court
verdicts to justify their claims. The big difference is that after death, the
dead are no more and have no control of their own reputation and
privacy in person, which mostly are at the mercy of the living.

B. Posthumous Reputation and History Censorship
"The dead belong to history[,]" 26 and "history is replete with tales
of people[,]"27 in particular dead people. This is true first with respect
to dead public figures, especially political figures. When a defamation
claim concerns a public figure, the related truth is relevant to narratives
of public history. 28 No one would deny that human history is made by
such persons and filled with their names and stories, although unknown
ordinaries certainly are no less important. It is not exaggerated to say
that the study of our past is the study of those who have left traces in
history and memory. 29 Therefore history is in a sense the narrative
composed of reputations of the deceased, the record of their past deeds,
and the assessment of such deeds and their characteristics by the living.
Intentional control of speeches and expressions regarding the dead' s
reputation, either facts or opinions, may lead to censorship of history in
different degrees on the following grounds.
Posthumous reputation matters to the dead' s family and
acquaintances in view of individual memories. 30 Changes in individual
reputations of the deceased can threaten or alter the memory of their
family members, which is possibly not satisfactory and therefore will
encounter the living' s resistance and interference. Another important
dimension of posthumous reputation lies in a collective sense. It is true
that not only do individuals have personal reputations, but many
collectives such as commercial institutions and NGOs also have
personal reputations. 31 We also talk about reputation of a people or a

26. See Pierre Guillaume, Law and History, VHO 31 (2008), available at
http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres7 /PGLawhistory. pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
27. RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE
AMERICAN DEAD 119 (2010).
28. Daphne Barak-Erez, Collective Memory and Judicial Legitimacy: The Historical
Narrative of the Israeli Supreme Court, 16 CAN. J. LAW & Soc. 93, 95 (2001).
29. See Ariela J. Gross, The Constitution of History and Memory, in LAW AND THE
HUMANITIES 416, 416-23 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2010) (explaining the relationship
between memory and history is controversial among historians and sociologists).
30. See id. at 416-31 (discussing collective memory and individual memory and law's
role in their formation).
31. For instance, reputation of the American FDA was regarded as a powerful
instrument in drug regulation. See generally David T. Zaring, Regulating by Repute, 110
MICH. L. REV 1003 (2012).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/4

10

Zhao: Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy: Hist

2014] Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Privacy

49

national state, in more collective sense, such as the reputation of Jews
and Chinese, or the Americans, or the French. Here, reputation is more
related to collective identity or collective honor in that it can distinguish
one ethnic group of people from another. The victim status of the Nazi
Holocausts, for example, has been deemed a strong collective identity
of the Jewish community. 32 Even for private associations, such as local
clubs, collective reputation and honor matters when members act in
improper ways, posing threats to internal order. 33
In some cases, individual reputations and identities are regarded as
heritage or legacy of ethnic groups, social groups or religious groups, so
that as the representatives of collective identities, such reputations and
identities deprive protection from well-accepted mores and ethics. In
this regard, strong historical figures, such as Mao and Stalin, are not
always approached in negative ways by their own nationals; many hold
great respect for the two deceased and regard them as inviolable, great
heroes. Similarly, Washington and Lincoln are icons of the American's
national characters and their reputations are public goods, albeit still
under public scrutiny. 34 Their posthumous reputations are significant
parts of national history and national identities.
Since the dead are important to our understanding and assessment
of the past, 35 they are important targets of history censorship. Thus an
unavoidable part of history censorship is the "systematical control" of
posthumous reputation. This includes a control of both factual accounts
of the dead' s past behaviors and the related judgments. This includes a
twist of "well established truth of the past", or as selective use of the
past, or as intended blurs of facts or opinions, etc. Political states are
not the sole censor. Posthumous reputation is related to history
censorship in the following ways.
First, the dead themselves are the censors of post mortem
32. Amit M. Schejter, 'The Pillar of Fire by Night, to Shew Them Light': Israeli
Broadcasting, the Supreme Court and the Zionist Narrative, 29 MEDIA CULTURE Soc. 916,
929 (2007) (arguing the significance of Holocaust victims status in the creation of a shared
collective identity for the Jewish community).
33. In Bath Club, the plaintiff was expelled for his defaming another member's
deceased father, which was deemed as injurious to the character and interests of the club.
See generally F.P. Walton, Libel upon the Dead and the Bath Club Case, 9 J. COMP. LEGIS.
& INT'L L. 1 (1927); see also Gotz Bottner, Protection of the Honour of Deceased Persons A Comparison Between the German and the Australian Legal Situations, 13 BOND L. REV. 5
108, 116 (2001).
34. Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 743, 745 (1986).
35. For instance, see Craik's explanation of how biography studies relate closely to
cultural history and their relationship with posthumous reputation. See CRAIK, supra note
10, at 194-99.
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reputations. Before death, those who cherish their own names would
destroy, hide, or alter the materials and information that may have
negative impacts on their reputation afterwards. Such efforts include
autobiography or biography writing under the control of the
protagonists themselves, so that their desired portraits or images can
preclude the negative judgment of others after death. 36 This is a kind of
self-censorship for self-protection, or for a protection of their legacy and
family interests, when the deceased's names matter a lot to surviving
families.
Second, close relatives, family members, and heirs have direct
interests in the dead's good reputation. Not only will they protect the
dead's reputation, but they also are more willing to protect their own
and their family's reputations that are in most cases closely-affiliated
with the deceased. 37 Those people may encounter mental distress and
personal, emotional harm consequent to defamation of their beloved
deceased.
There are monetary interests involved in the dead's
reputation and privacy as well. 38 The dead's family may be the most
motivated censors and they can intimidate critics who dare to stand out
against their memory of the dead. This is especially true when the
deceased's families hold high social status that may be even more
degraded by posthumous defamation, were there no strong defense from
the families before the public. Such families can censor negative
information regarding the dead with considerable economic and
political resources available. 39
Third, many people other than family members and designated
heirs bear no less strong motivations to defend the deceased's
reputation. Numerous foundations, institutions and associations of nongovernmental nature are ready to take necessary steps to protect the
dead for whose remembrance they have been established. They are

36. Id. at 190; see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of
Biography, 43 STAN. L. Rev. 299 (2011) (discussing the relation between law and biography
writing in the U .S.).
37. Following Brewer, family is the first natural honor groups, which we are all,
affiliated with. See BOWMAN, supra note 12, at 4.
38. Especially in the cases of publicity rights and copyrights involve. See MADOFF,
supra note 28, at 130-51.
39. According to Post, there is a shift from government silencing powerless people to
powerful people silencing the powerless behind state power. See ROBERT POST, CENSORSHIP
AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURE REGULATION (Getty Research Inst. 1998).
MacKinnon has a similar expression: "The operative definition of censorship accordingly
shifts from government silencing what powerless people say, to powerful people violating
powerless people into silence and hiding behind state power to do it." CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 10 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996)(1993).
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history museums, private foundations, war crime memorial associations,
victims associations, religious groups, and even commercial
institutions. 40 This also includes determined individual supporters of
deceased politicians, war heroes (heroines), religious martyrs, or even
celebrities like Diana, Princess of Wales. They make open protests on
streets, 41 publish advocates in newspapers, 42 initiate petitions against
defamers of their religion, 43 and participate in litigation. 44 In many
cases, their motivations could be their love of and trust in the deceased
politicians, such as Gandhi, and dead religious leaders, such as the
Vatican Pope, 45 or merely sympathy and determination to seek justice
for the deceased, or shared contribution to the same ideal or project, 46
etc.
Fourth, a community as a whole can play the role of censorship in

40. For example, to protect Jobs' likeness, Apple considered suing in California
against a Chinese company that made toy products by illegal appropriation of Jobs' likeness.
Tecca, Apple May File Lawsuit Against the Makers of Disturbingly Realistic Steve Jobs
Doll,
YAHOO
NEWS
(Jan.
6,
2012,
9:06
PM),
available
at
http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/technology-blog/apple-may-file-lawsuit-against-makersdisturbingly-realistic-020637702.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
41. As seen in the recent popular protests against describing Trayvon Martin as a
potential killer and a convict, as well as George Zimmerman's acquittal. Lizette Alvarez &
Cara Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in Killing of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES (July 14,
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07 /15/us/george-zimmerman-verdicttrayvon-martin.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
42. As seen in Lehideux and lsorni v. France, in which the plaintiffs published an
advertisement on the local newspaper to remind the French people of Philippe Petain, the
formal collaborator of Nazi occupation. See Lehideux & Isorni v. France, App. No.
available at
24662/94,
para.
45
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
Sept.
23,
2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-58245 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
43. As seen by the numerous protests of Muslims against defamations of their religious
prophets.
44. Across the world, many associations consisted of lawyers, activists, academics and
veterans are actively supporting the victims of comfort women from Japan, Korea, China
and other Asian countries to seek legal remedies in Japan. For a detailed discussion of the
international support, see PEIPEI QIU, CHINESE COMFORT WOMEN: TESTIMONIES FROM
IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEX SLAVES 184- 90 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
45. See the libel trial of Robert Katz regarding the accused silence of Pope Pius XII in
Nazi occupation. See Bruce Weber, Robert Katz, Who Wrote of Nazi Massacre in Italy,
77,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2010),
available
at
Dies
at
http://www.nytimes.com/201 Oil 0/22/arts/22katz.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (the case
will be further discussed in Section IV(H)).
46. As such in the military struggles of the Partisans in Spain, Italian and France
against German occupation, which were overlooked or underestimated during the Cold War
Period, many partisans have sued to correct the "wrong version" of the past military
conflicts. See, e.g., Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
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order to protect its collective identities and honor, so that the past may
only be portrayed in a much-favored way and the deceased are
forbidden to be criticized. In this context, collective morals are a firm
source and confirmation of potential censorship. For instance, a
German local community tried to silence a young researcher who
investigated its previous support of the Nazi regime, and her research
would downplay the previous collective identity of resisting Nazi
policies. 47 Another situation involves "vulnerable" racial or religious
communities (groups) that are sensitive and paranoid to certain
expressions and speeches about their past, so that they need official
protection for control. 48 Such collective identity and emotional interest
may generate a strong atmosphere or ethos to support censorship.
Finally, the strongest censors are the political state in abstract.
Political states and ruling parties need political legitimacy and
justification of their ruling. For totalitarian or dictatorial states, history
plays a considerable role in providing legitimacy for political leaders
such as Stalin and Saddam Hussein. 49 In China and North Korea,
history has been tightly controlled for political use. 50 In such countries,
open discussion of the dead's name, and of dead political figures in
particular, is not allowed. Some countries, such as Turkey, even have
direct statutes to protect dead leaders' reputation and honor. In sharp
contrast, most democracies draw legitimacy from ballots and rule of
law. They do not have a strong motive to censor history for legitimacy.
This, however, does not say that they do not conduct history censorship
or similar activities. It only means that there is no systematic history
4 7. See the story of German author Anja Rosmus-Wenninger, which will be discussed
below. Corinna Coulmas & Saul Friedlander, Memory and Identity Problems in Post-War
Germany According to Age Groups, available at http://www.corinna-coulmas.eu/memoryand-identity-problems-in-post-war-germany-according-to-age-groups.html (last visited Dec.
3, 2014).
48. For instance, Canadian Human rights jurisprudence supports the concept that
"Islam needs singular protection against defamatory speech." Allison G. Belnap,
Defamation of Religions: A Vague and Overbroad Theory that Threatens Basic Human
Rights, BYU L. Rev. 635, 676 (2010).
49. MACMILLAN, supra note 4, at 17-18.
50. For example, children of North Korea were taught that the South started the
Korean War in 1950s and was defeated by the North; with the interference of Soviet Unions
and China also not mentioned as the critical support of its war efforts. See Sarah Buckley,
North Korea's "Creative" History, BBC (July 25, 2003), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3096265.stm (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). China's
official history is no better than the North Korean's version, however. Howard W. French,
China's Textbooks Twist and Omit History, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/06/intemational/asia/06textbook.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2014). As the high school history teacher Chen Minghua said in Shanghai, the closer the
Chinese history gets to the present, the more political it becomes. Id.
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censorship in Westem democracies. Instead they have been troubled by
other problems of a different nature at different historical periods. 51

III. THE LEGAL APPARATUSES FOR PROTECTION
Be it interests of the dead, their surviving families, their associates,
affiliated social groups, special communities, or political states,
nowadays the control (or censorship) of speeches and information
regarding the past has to be carried out through legal means; otherwise,
it lacks legitimacy and cannot be accepted in modem politics. In the
following, different legal apparatuses that can be used to protect
posthumous reputation and privacy will be briefly discussed for the
further case analysis.
A. Blasphemy Law, Insult Law and Sedition Law

As an old legal instrument, blasphemy laws protect religious belief
and dead religious figures in many countries. 52 Many Westem
countries, such as the United States, have abolished blasphemy laws
while others keep such laws merely on paper, a step away from
abolishment. 53 Some countries, such as Ireland and Russia, have
recently enacted blasphemy laws. 54 As Uta Melzer noted, such laws
exist in Asia and the Middle East, particularly in Islamic countries that

51. For instance, history can be controlled to strengthen national identity formation
and to enhance political transition by avoiding hatred and revenge among previously
conflicted social groups in a community. See Josep Maria Tamarit Sumalla, Transition,
Historical Memory and Criminal Justice in Spain, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 729 (2011). For
example, see the court's role in Israeli state formation (Barak-Erez) and the use of oblivion
law in Spain's restoration of democracy. See id.; Miren Gutierrez, Spain: Historical
Amnesia on Display, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (Nov. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2012/11 /spain-historical-amnesia-on-display/
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
52. They "act as a sanctioned limitation on the right of expression." Belnap, supra note
49, at 670-71. Note that many UN commission resolutions over years "have asked state
governments and international bodies to provide protection against defamation of religions
in increasingly robust terms." Id. at 664.
53. See generally id. at 670-79 (discussing such laws in most OIC (Organization of
Islamic Cooperation) member states and other western countries). For a country-to-country
list of Blasphemy laws in the Middle East see Country-by-Country Blasphemy Laws in the
Middle
East,
SELFSCHOLAR
(Dec.
19,
2012),
available
at
http://selfscholar.wordpress.com/2012/12/19/blasphemy-laws-in-the-middle-east/
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
54. Though Ireland decriminalized defamation, Article 36 of the 2009 Defamation Act
introduced blasphemy as an offense. PATTI McCRACKEN, INSULT LAWS: INSULTING TO
PRESS FREEDOM-A GUIDE TO EVOLUTION OF INSULT LA ws IN 20 I 0, at 16 (Ronald Koven ed.,
2012), available at Freedom House.
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campaign to criminalize defamation of religion, and such laws usually
reach beyond religious protection, restricting calls for political reform. 55
For religious reasons, dead religious figures are not allowed to be
criticized and commented about negatively, which is a strong category
of repression of free speech.
Some jurisdictions directly protect honor and reputation of the
nobles by insult laws without even concealing the intention, which
criminalizes posthumous defamation.
Such laws usually protect
monarchs, kings or state heads (nowadays) not necessarily in nondemocracies. Rulers, as De Baets commented, "have recorded [certain]
version[ s] of history to secure their posthumous fame[ s,] and their
successors often abide by [such] version[s]." 56 For instance, the 1959
Thai legislation protects the deceased Monarchs, 57 the 1951 Turkish law
secures the legacy of Ataturk, 58 and Iranian law punishes insults against
the memory of Imam Khomeini. 59 Meanwhile, Kings and emperors
"proved sensitive" in other countries such as Morocco, Kuwait and
Bahrain. 60 Furthermore, insult laws also protect the honor of political
figures and public officials in some European countries, including the
dead. For example, Article 490 and Article 491 of the Spanish Penal
Code punish insults of the royal family and use of their images,
including the king's ancestors. 61 French law prohibited insult of heads
of state under its 1881 legislation for a long period until the annulations
by European Union ("EU") judges that French law has violated a
protester's right to freedom of expression. 62 In general, as Whiteman
55. UTA MELZER, INSULT LAWS: IN CONTEMPT OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO EVOLUTION OF
INSULT LAWS IN 2009, at 8-11 (Ronald Koven ed., 2010), available at World Press Freedom
Committee.
56. DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 77.
57. MELZER, supra note 56, at 165-69.
58. See id. at 40 (describing the Law on Crimes Committed Against Atatiirk (Law No.
5816)).
59. See id. at 192 (describing Article 514 of the 1991 Islamic Penal Code oflran).
60. Id. at 9.
61. C6DIGO
PENAL
[C.P.]
art.
490,
491
(Spain),
available
at
https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-l 995-25444 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
62. A Parisian bystander at a parade uttered the words "Hoohoo" when President
Charles de Gaulle passed by, and this merited a conviction for insult under article 26 of the
1881 Law on Freedom of the Press. But this law has been challenged by the verdict of the
ECtHR in March 2013 in that France has violated a protester's right to freedom of
expression by fining him. See Eon v. France, App. No. 26188/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. March 14,
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO l -1177 42 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014); see also Peter Allen, French President Insults no Longer an
Automatic Criminal Offence, TELEGRAPH (Jul.
25,
2013),
available at
http://www. telegraph .co. uk/news/worldnews/francois-ho llande/10203 142/French-presidentinsults-no-longer-an-automatic-criminal-offence.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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pointed out, there is a long tradition in European countries of protecting
the nobility of upper classes, which is represented by France and
Germany. 63
With a long tradition, sedition law, in particular seditious libel and
seditious words, 64 can be manipulated for history censorship while
sought to protect reputations of selected people to prevent social
disorder and public incitement. "The point of sedition law was to
protect the status quo, the regime-and the reputation of elite people,
respectable people in general."65 As Mayton said, the law of seditious
libel has shifted its emphasis from protecting "government or
governmental officials" to restricting "the potential of dissident speech
to bring about illegal acts" in modem times. 66 "In most of the mature
democracies, the law of sedition has now either formally been rescinded
or is largely defunct", 67 but some democracies still keep such a law or
even revive it. 68
B. Defamation Law

Defamation is both a criminal offense and a civil offense, 69 and can
be conducted by means of libel in written forms and slander in spoken
forms. Defamation of the dead can be punished in some jurisdictions.
63. See James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 Yale
L.J. 1279 (2000).
64. Post, supra note 12, at 736.
65. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE'S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 54 (Stanford Univ. Press 1st ed.
2007).
66. William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of
Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 91 (1984).
67. Memorandum on the Malaysian Sedition Act 1948, ARTICLE 19, at 6 (2003),
available at http://www.article 19 .org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/malaysia-sedit.03.pdf (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
68. For instance, the Australian Federal Parliament passed a law about sedition in late
2005, which was criticized by scholars. See, e.g., George Williams, Op-Ed., Speak up in
Defence of Free Speech, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (May 30, 2006), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/speak-up-in-defence-of-free-speech/2006/05/29/1148
754937566.html?page=fullpage (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). For a list of these countries,
mostly common law countries, updated to 2010 at the official website of Australian Federal
Parliament see Roy Jordan, In Good Faith: Sedition Law in Australia, PARLIAMENT OF
AUSTRALIA (2010), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_
Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/archive/sedition (last visited Dec.
3, 2014).
69. There are only about a dozen of countries that decriminalize defamation while the
majority keeps it, even if for most democracies they are merely laws on paper. See an
analysis of criminal defamation by ARTICLE 19. See Defamation Maps, ARTICLE 19,
available at http://www.articlel9.org/defamation/map.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014)
(analysis of criminal defamation).
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In the first instance, when there are no particular laws protecting the
deceased's reputation and honor, they might still be protected by courts
under ordinary defamation law. In general, continental law jurisdictions
protect the deceased' s reputation and dignity to different extents. For
instance, French courts protected the deceased's reputation and privacy
especially when public figures are involved. 70 Maltese courts protected
the reputation of the deceased Prime Minister, Dr. Bofa, when he was
alleged by Journalist Mizzi of abusing power in land planning for
private interest. 71
In the second instance, there are direct clauses in criminal law and
civil law to protect the deceased's reputation and privacy in some
jurisdictions. For instance, the Indonesian Penal Code explicitly
protects the deceased's reputation and likeness. 72 Sections 305 and 306
of the Cameroon Penal Code prescribe that defamation of the dead is
punishable if the intent is "to injure the honor or reputation" of a living
spouse or heirs. 73 Similar laws can be found in Turkey, although the
intention is to protect the affiliated living's reputations. 74 One may also
note that the Sudanese Penal Code punishes any person who "imputes to
any honorable living or dead person by express words, implicitly, by
writing or via indicative signs accusations of Zina or Sodomy, or
illegitimacy commits Qadhf."75 This is not limited to developing
countries. Article 188 of German Penal Code prescribes that the
deceased's parents and children have the legal standing to sue 76 ; Article
175 of the Swiss Criminal Code punishes defamation of the dead who
have been deceased no less than thirty years. 77 Israeli defamation law
70. For instance, see the French Pion case regarding the late President Mitterrand. See
Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00, para. 71 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 18, 2004),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-617 60 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014) (case regarding the late French President Mitterrand).
71. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 22, 2012),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec.
4, 2014).
72. MELZER, supra note 56, at 157- 58.
73. See id. at 74.
74. See id. at 37-40 (highlighting Article 130 of the Turkish Penal Code).
75. Id. at 211 (quoting Article 157 of the Sudanese Penal Code).
76. See, e.g., Hannes Rosier, Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights - An
Analysis of US. and German Constitutional and Tort Law, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 153
(2008); Gotz Bottner, Protection of the Honour of Deceased Persons-A Comparison
Between the German and the Australian Legal Situations, 13 BOND L. REV. 121, 121 (2001),
available at epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= l 199&context=blr (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
77. SCHWEIZERJSCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB], CODE PENAL SUISSE [CP] [CRIMINAL
CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, AS 311 (2014), art. 175 (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/311_0/a175.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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also accepts complaints against defamation of the dead. 78
In contrast, common law countries do not protect posthumous
reputation and privacy. The rationale is that since the dead are no
longer living, they cannot be harmed after death. 79 In common law
jurisdictions, particularly in the U.S., reputation is a personal matter and
the right cannot be inherited by the living.80 "Though most rules in
modem defamation law defy mechanical application, the centuries-old
rule
against
liability
for
defamation
of
dead
people kicks in automatically." 81 Family members or heirs of the dead
have no legal standing to sue on the deceased's behalf. 82 Also,
"defamation of a deceased person generally does not give rise to a right
of action at common law in favor of the surviving spouse, family, or
relatives who are not defamed." 83 However, they can initiate lawsuits to
protect their own reputation and privacy, so that the deceased's name
could be restituted to some extent. 84
78. Section 5 of the 1967 Defamation Law (amended version) prescribes that
"[ d]efamatory statements regarding a Deceased Person that are published after his or her
death shall be treated as the defamation of a living person, but do not constitute cause for a
civil claim or a private criminal complaint, and no indictment shall be submitted for an
offense under this section unless it is requested by the deceased's spouse or one of his
children, grandchildren, parents, brothers or sisters." Defamation Law, 5725-1965, 19 LSI
254, Sec. 5 (1967) (Isr.), available at www.nevo.co.il/law_html/LawOl/019_002.htm (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014); see also Elad Peled, Israeli Law of Defamation: A Comparative
Perspective and a Sociological Analysis, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 735, 753
(2011 ), available at www.uiowa.edu/-tlcp/TLCP%20Articles/20-3/Peled%20Final.pdf (last
visited Dec. 3 2014).
79. See Iryami, supra note 19, at 1088 ("the rule on defamation of the dead is
consistent through-out common law jurisdictions.").
80. Libel. Defamation ofDead Person. Injury to Reputations ofSurviving Relatives, 40
COLUM. L. REV. 1267, 1268- 69 (1940), available at www.jstor.org/stable/1117780 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014) (describing the rationales underlying the denial in majority of
American cases).
81. Lisa Brown, Dead but not Forgotten: Proposals for Imposing Liability for
Defamation of the Dead, 67 TEX. L. Rev. 1525, 1525 (1989).
82. Iryami supra note 19, at 1089- 95.
83. Smolensky, supra note 82, at 23 (quoting 50 AM. JuR. 2o Libel and Slander§ 336
(2014)).
84. This indirect approach is successful at least in the U.S. in some occasions. See
Iryami, supra note 19, at 1095-96. In the UK, there are a couple of cases in which the living
family of the dead won in exceptional cases. For instance, Mrs. Sukarno won an apology in
court from a publisher alleging her husband having sexual relations with a call girl when he
was a guest of the British Government. See News in Brief Mrs. Sukarno Wins Libel Suit,
MILWAUKEE J., June 21, 1974, part 1 pg. 3, available at http://news.google.com/
newspapers?nid= 1499&dat= 19740621 &id=TwgqAAAAIBAJ&sjid=8SgEAAAAIBAJ &pg
=4238,14080 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). The case was the first time in British court that any
one not directly implicated in the publication successfully sued over defamatory statements
made about a dead person. Id. (Mrs. Sukarno won an apology in court from a publisher
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C. Privacy Law and Others
Reputations during life are also protected by the right of privacy. 85
Due to the close affiliation of privacy with reputation, 86 the dead's
privacy is also closely related to their posthumous reputation. In
particular, laws regarding public disclosure of private affairs and false
lights may protect the dead' s reputations to a certain degree. 87 After
death, disclosure of private issues can have a great impact on the dead' s
reputation, which we can observe in many real cases. 88 To put the dead
under a false light by disclosing their names, private activities, or their
likeness can be against the dead' s will to be left alone post mortem and
can create a misleading impression of the dead, harming their dignity
and reputation, and in many occasions, also the honor and dignity of the
dead's family in the eyes of the living. 89
In continental law countries, the dead' s privacy may have been
protected and the living family members are allowed to sue on their
behalf. For example, French courts protect the dead's privacy and
reputation even if there is no statutory law explicitly protecting the
interest of the dead. 90 Another example is that privacy laws of the
Czech Republic and Slovakia; both protect the privacy of the dead on
the ground of human dignity. 91 However, common law countries do not
protect the privacy of the dead, since privacy is a personal issue and one

alleging her husband having sexual relations with a call girl when he was a guest of the
British Government. The case was the first time in British court that any one not directly
implicated in the publication successfully sued over defamatory statements made about a
dead person).
85. MADOFF, supra note 28, at 123.
86. See supra Section II.A.
87. For a more detailed discussion of posthumous privacy in light of Prosser's
categorizations, see DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 124-26.
88. Again, for example, see that case of the British Jimmy Savile. See Reuters, Jimmy
Savile: NSPCC Say Report May Help Victims to Come to Terms with Abuse, TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 12, 2013), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/jimmysavile/9796852/Jimmy-Savile-NSPCC-say-report-may-help-victims-to-come-to-terms-withabuse.html (last visited Dec.3, 2014).
89. See Hachette Filipacchi Associes v. France, App. No. 71111/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June
14, 2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-81066
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (see for instance, the French case in which a dead local
politician's death scene pictures were published by a newspaper after his assassination).
90. Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18, 2004),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014).
91. Analysis and Translation by Martin Duchac, Student Research Assistant (June 23,
2011) (on file with author).
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cannot sue on the dead's behalf. 92 Obviously the dead cannot feel
humiliation and shame post mortem. 93 The living may lodge cases
because their own privacy is directly involved or they may suffer from
emotional distress upon privacy invasion of the dead. 94 In this regard,
even the American law protects the living family's privacy involving
death-scene photographs to provide "refuge from a sensation-seeking
culture. " 95
Privacy laws that can indirectly protect the dead's reputation are
laws protecting publicity rights after death, including illegal
appropriation of the dead's likeness, illegal use of the dead's names,
false lights, and publication of private affairs.
Closely related to illegal appropriation of personal likeness are the
right to publicity and copyright that make it possible to generate
revenue after one's death. The first allows a person to control the
exploitation of his image and the later to control his creations. 96 For
example, the protections from the right to publicity and copyright can
continue after death in the U.S. In recent years such protections
(rights), according to Madoff, "have grown in strength and duration,
providing posthumous protections never before seen in history", though
strictly limited to economic interests, as opposed to reputational
interests. 97 But, as the author argued, in the U.S. context at least, both
rights co-exist with reputation and personality, and they cannot be
separated from each other with clear-cut lines. 98
Furthermore, confidentiality rules of some special professions
request service providers to keep personal data of the deceased from

92. Iryami, supra note 19 at 1097- 99 (arguing "the common law rule that prohibits a
cause of action for defamation of the dead is analogous to its rule for invasion of privacy
upon the dead", and "courts and authorities have long assumed that one's legal interest in
privacy ends upon death.").
93. Paul Roth, Privacy Proceedings and the Dead, 11 PRIV. L. & PoL'Y REP. 50
(2004); see also Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian
Privacy Law and Practice, AUSTRALIAN L. REFORM COMMISSION 355 (2008), available at
http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/8.%20Privacy%20of%>20Deceased%20Individuals/intr
oduction#_ftnl (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
94. See also Daily Mail Reporter, Westboro Baptist Church Vows to "Quadruple' its
Protests at Military Funerals After Supreme Court Rules in its Favour, MAILONLINE,
available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1362288/Westboro-Baptist-Churchvictory-Supreme-Court-rules-favour-protests-military-funerals.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2014) (describing the story of Matthew Snyder, a deceased American soldier).
95. National Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
96. See MADOFF, supra note 28, at 131 for Madoff's account of the two rights under
the U.S. law that protects the dead's interest.
97. Id. at 131.
98. Id. at 131-40, 148-49.
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unintended disclosure, which can pose potential harm to the dead and
their families. For example, medical data of the deceased and personal
information of customers in hands of their lawyers is under protection
of confidentiality law, so that those professions would not be destructed
by such breach. 99
D. Memory Law and Oblivion Law

Privacy law and defamation law are the two major legal
instruments to protect the deceased's reputation. Their locus is at the
individual level. In contrast, there are also legal instruments protecting
the dead's reputation in a collective sense.
Such laws protect
reputation, honor, identities, or dignity of various social groups and
communities whose degradation naturally lowers the reputation and
honor of their members as a consequence.
The first category includes memory laws that are widely criticized
as against international human rights law. For instance, the 1990
French Memory Law criminalizes denial of the Jewish Holocaust. 100
The law, on the one hand, punishes the denial of the Holocaust that
particularly amounts to a rejection of the Jewish victims' social status
and harm to their dignity. On the other hand, a court-supported
historiography functions as a tool to combat racism, negationism, and
revisionism. 101 Similar laws can be found in European countries such as
Belgium, Poland, Germany, Austria, Lithuania, and the Czech
Republic. 102 Other countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, and
Switzerland, take a more general approach to cope with denials of all
99. For medical data confidentiality, see D.S. James & S. Leadbeatter, Confidentiality,
Death and the Doctor, 49 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 1, 1--4 (1996); Jessica Wilen Berg, Grave
Secrets: Legal and Ethical Analysis of Postmortem Confidentiality, 84 CONN. L. REV. 81
(2001); Mary Donnelly & Maeve McDonagh, Keeping the Secrets of the Dead? An
Evaluation of the Statutory Framework for Access to Information About Deceased Persons ,
LEGAL STUDIES (2010).
100. Loi 90-615 du 13 juillet 1990 tendant a reprimer tout acte raciste, antisemite ou
xenophobe [Law No. 90-615 of 13 July 1990 on the Punishment of All Racist, Anti-Semitic
or Xenophobic], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETIE
OF FRANCE], Feb. 24, 2004 (also known as the Gayssot Act, Law No. 90-615 of July 13,
1990); see also Roger W. Smith, Legislating against Genocide Denial: Criminalizing
Denial or Preventing Free Speech, 4 ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 128, 133 (2009).
101. Raffi Wartanian, Memory Laws in France and Their Implications:
HUMANITY
rN
ACTION,
available
at
Institutionalizing
Social
Harmony,
http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/117-memory-laws-in-france-and-theirimplications-institutionalizing-social-harmony (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
102. See Jacqueline Lechtholtz-Zey, The Laws Banning Holocaust Denial, GPN
BULLETIN (2012), available at http://www.genocidepreventionnow.org/Portals/O/docs/
Holocaust_Denial_Updated_2.8.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (discussing such domestic
laws and international treaties).
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crimes against humanity, including the Holocaust. 103
Protection of posthumous reputation and dignity can be found in
rehabilitation laws that aim to relieve the deceased victims and their
surviving families from unjust political accusations. In the early 1990s,
most former communist countries in Eastern Europe promulgated
rehabilitation laws. 104 Since then, family members of the dead victims
have started to bring justice to the deceased, trying to restore their honor
and dignity by law. 105 In addition, posthumous rehabilitation also
involves the dead victims of atrocities and massacres such as Katyn,
who are still denied victim status by the Russian authority. 106
A similar situation involves the truth commissions established in
many countries by law after political traumas and military conflicts.
Whether the dead victims can be offered restoration and justice, and the
dead perpetrators would be prosecuted, is crucial not only for future
peace construction, but also for the dead victims' dignity and reputation,
and their remaining families.
In this respect, however, amnesty laws may function as a shield to
retroactively exempt political leaders and military leaders from criminal
charges of their past crimes against humanity and human rights abuses.
For instance, the Spanish Amnesty Law was democratically voted and is
still valid today. 107 In the deeply wounded Spanish community,
reprisals and revenges would have led to social disorder and distracted
its transition to democracy without this law. 108 In some truth
103. Id. (under the rubric of hate speech, incitement speech, and racial discrimination).
104. LAVINIA STAN, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA: THE
POLITICS OF MEMORY 163- 65 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). For instance, the Russian
Rehabilitation Act's purpose is "the rehabilitation of all victims of political repression who
were prosecuted on the territory of the Russian Federation after 7 November 1917, and
restoration of their civil rights." Id.; see Janowiec v. Russia, App. nos. 55508/07 &
29520/09
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
Oct.
21,
2013),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-127684 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
105. Kurzac v. Poland, App. No. 31382/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2001) (for instance,
a brother of the dead victim of the political conviction by the previous Polish Communist
regime, appealed before the ECtHR for a violation of his right to fair trial under Article 6 of
the Convention and won).
l 06. See Janowiec v. Russia, App. nos. 55508/07 & 29520/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 21,
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-127684 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
107. Ackar Kadribasic, Transitional Justice in Democratization Processes: the Case of
Spain from an International Point of View, 1 INT'L J. RULE L., TRANS'L JUST. & HUM. RTS.
132, 132- 33 (2010).
108. Id. at 132- 33 (in contrast, the Chilean amnesty law is a product of the military
before the end of totalitarian ruling in contrast to exempt military leaders from future
charges).
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commissions' reports, even names of the perpetrators were not
mentioned because of the existence of such amnesty law. 109 This means
that the dead perpetrators cannot be singled out or named responsible
for past crimes and their reputations remain somehow intact.
However, the recent practice of international law has challenged
such an approach to promote political transition at the price of justice
and human rights. The Special Court for Sierra Leone decided that the
amnesties granted by a peace agreement are no bar to prosecutions
before it. 110 Also, the 2005 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/147
prescribes, as one of the ways of giving satisfaction, "an official
declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation
and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the
victim." 111
What's related to the deceased's reputation in a fundamental sense
is human dignity and respect, which have been protected by the laws
both at the national level and at the international level. The idea is that
even if the dead are no longer living, they still deserve the minimum
respect and decent treatment as passed human beings. 112
In
constitutions of many Western countries, in particular European
countries, human dignity has been regarded as the fundamental right to
include individual honor, reputation and private life (family life). For
example, German law recognizes dignity of human beings covering not
only the living, but also the dead. 113
A last note is the legal protection of the dead' s dignity and
reputation after enforced disappearance that has been recognized in an
important international treaty promulgated in December 2010: The
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance. Article 24, clauses 4 & 5( c), of the law
prescribe that "the victims of enforced disappearance have the right to
obtain reparation and prompt, fair and adequate compensation", and
109. Id. at 132.
110. See Simon M. Meisenberg, Legality of Amnesties in International Humanitarian
Law: The Lome Amnesty Decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 86 INT'L Rev. RED
CROSS 837, 843 (2004) (as the first decision to deny the validity of amnesty law, this
decision is of critical importance for the development oflnternational Humanitarian Law).
111. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. AIRES/ 4/1 (Mar. 21, 2006).
112. A reason why in most communities we are asked to keep silence in graveyards
and cannibalism is regarded as against humanity even in times of war and famines . See DE
BAETS, supra note 4, at 124- 25.
113. See Hannes Rosler, Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights An Analysis of
US. and German Constitutional and Tort Law, 26 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 153, 196 (2008).
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reparation includes not only material and moral damages, but also other
forms such as "satisfaction, including restoration of dignity and
reputation." This law defines victims as "the disappeared person and
any individual who has suffered harm as the direct result of an enforced
disappearance." 114
The above are the relevant domestic laws and international laws
regarding protection of the dead's reputation, privacy and dignity from
different perspectives. Laws protecting the free speech rights of
individuals shall also be considered in this context, since on the
contrary, their stronger protection means a weaker protection of the
dead's reputation and dignity. Protection of free speech and its
relationship to posthumous reputation protection will be further
discussed in Section V.

IV. LEGAL CASES ON POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND
PRIVACY
History censorship has been conducted by state authority not only
in totalitarian and authoritarian countries, but also in democracies. This
is reflected in legal cases in which state authority tries to support
official versions of history, and restrict its critics to protect public
figures, in particular political leaders. The state has done this by
passing special laws to prevent public scrutiny, by protecting religious
identity by punishing certain expressions, and by refusing rehabilitation
of victims of crimes against humanity for national pride, etc.
Since it is impossible to discuss all the cases that have been
collected by this research, this section will classify them into eight
categories for analysis. It will try to explain the circumstances of such
cases, including the disputed history at stake, complaints of plaintiffs,
political-social settings, court rulings with regard to interference, etc. to
check possible history censorship involved and the underlying
reasoning.
A. Posthumous Reputation and Collective Memory
Posthumous reputation is an important element to national identity
formation, national history, and collective memory. 115 This is the
114. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance art. 24(1), Dec. 23, 2010, 2715 U.N.T.S (validated since Dec. 23, 2010, with
92 signatories and 38 parties).
115. Though history and collective memory are perceived differently by many
historians. See GROSS, supra note 30, at 6- 9.
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reason why many states demonstrate great interest in its protection.
First of all, reputations of deceased heroes, heroines, or martyrs, who
are regarded as icons of the national identities by their communities, are
good targets for recounting the stories of history.
In the Israeli case of Szenes, the deceased heroine is "one of the
prominent icons of the Zionist narrative." 116 Fifty years after her brave
death in 1944, Chana Szenes was ridiculed and defamed by the
Broadcasting Authority and others posthumously in a fictional drama. 117
The petitioners claimed the tale of Szenes' bravery belongs to the
history of the Jewish nation and is part of national folklore, 118
demanding protection of the dead's reputation for public interest. Chief
Justice Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court, on behalf of the majority,
first explained the importance of posthumous reputation to the Israeli
community, expressing that "the only asset of many people, both public
servants and those working in the private sector, is their reputation,
which they cherish as life itself. This applies to both the living and the
dead." 119 He further explained "[w]e must protect the dignity of the
deceased and their good name." 120 He recognized that the alleged
paragraph "offended the memory of Chana Szenes[,] ... maligned her
dignity and the myth surrounding her", and injured the feelings of the
public in general and that of Holocaust survivors in particular, and also
injured those who "cherish the memory" of the dead Szenes. 121 Also,
Chief Justice Barak confirmed that the defamation of Szenes harmed
national values 122 and the public interest for Israeli law to protect
includes collective identity and national history. 123
Justice Cheshin, in the dissenting opinion, clarified that human
dignity and the right to liberty, the right to reputation and the right to
freedom of expression are of equal legal status under the Israeli Basic
Law. 124 He further stated that "human dignity includes a person's
reputation", 125 while stressing the importance of Freedom of speech as

116. Schejter, supra note 33, at 924.
117. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority [1999] (Isr.).
118. See id. para. 4.
119. Id. para. 12.
120. Id.
121. See id. para. 12-14.
122. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority para. 12-14 [1999] (Isr.).
123. See id. para. 13-14 ("Each state has its own collective identity; each state has its
national history and its own social goals, the realization of which forms part of the public
interest.").
124. Id. para. 18, 21, 26 (Cheshin, J. dissenting).
125. Id. para. 29 (Cheshin, J. dissenting).
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one of the State of Israel's fundamental values as a democratic state. 126
Cheshin ruled that "[w ]e are dealing with a right of dimensions
struggling against a smaller right. The dignity and reputation of Chana
easily prevail over the rights of the playwright and the Broadcasting
Authority." 127 However, the majority of the court disagreed that only a
near certainty of grave and severe harm to public interest, the reputation
and dignity of the deceased and public feelings, can warrant the court's
intervention. 128 Since this is not the situation in the instant case, the
majority refused to protect the dead's reputation, even noting the
importance of the dead's reputation to Israeli collective memory. 129
Justice M. Cheshin made an important distinction between persons
and historical figures of the Israeli Deformation Law (1967) regarding
protection of the diseased. 13 Cheshin explained that the law protects
only the dead persons' reputations and dignity, not historical figures. 131
Cheshin explained that persons are those dead who have relatives to sue
for protection of their interests, namely heirs, family members and close
relatives. 132 Another criterion to define a dead person is whether there
are people alive who knew the dead personally; if there are persons still
knowing him or her, the dead continues to be a person. 133 The two
criteria can define the confine of the protection of posthumous
reputation and dignity by the Israeli law.
In contrast, following Justice Cheshin's distinction, Taiwanese
courts went too far in 1976 to protect a Chinese poet's reputation, who
died a thousand years ago. 134 The poet Han Yu holds an iconic status in
Chinese classical literature and has been highly respected for his
contribution to traditional Chinese culture. He was "defamed" by a
historian in the latter's journal article that described the dead as a
Lothario who died from abuse of poisonous chemicals. A distant
descendent accused the author of libelling the dead and damaging the
respect and memory of his ancestor. Both the trial court and the appeals

°

126. See id para. 9.
127. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority para. 37 [1999] (Isr.)
(Cheshin, J., dissenting).
128. See id para. 20, 28, 34.
129. See id para 24 (the court concluded: "However, a democratic society does not
preserve the image of its heroes by repressing freedom of expression and artistic creation.).
The legend must flow from free exchange of ideas and opinions. See also id para. 27.
130. Id para. 24 (Cheshin, J. dissenting).
131. Id
132. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority para. 19, 24 [1999] (Isr.)
(Cheshin, J., dissenting).
133. Id para. 24 (Cheshin, J. dissenting).
134. See YANG RENSHOU
FAXUE FANGFA LUN
1-6 (1999).
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court found the accused guilty, partially due to the reason that the
defamation was a threat to the Chinese cultural identity.
The
posthumous protection has its deep origin in the long Chinese tradition
to respect dead ancestors. 135
After the death of many dictators and the collapse of their regimes,
they have been re-evaluated by new communities with transformed
morals and political ideologies. Their supporters have conflicted with
dissenters over the problem of how to handle the memory and legacies
of the deceased dictators. Many have lodged defamation cases in court.
For instance, Franco, the deceased Spanish dictator, was recently
mocked by an artist who put a sculpture of him in a refrigerator,
indicating his still "being fresh" in modem Spain. 136 The artist was
accused in 2012 by an organization called the Francisco Franco
Foundation, claiming defamation of Franco and seeking 18,000 euros in
damages. Supporters and opponents also bear different memories to the
dead dictators and they have much departed views of the past. In such
cases, judicial decisions are critical in confirming which view is
justified before the public.
Under many circumstances, historians' research and publication
regarding the deceased' s reputation have challenged the memory and
identity of local communities that have constructed a desired memory
and identity by means of voluntary forgetting or hiding some dark past.
When historian Anja Rosmus-Wenninger stood up to investigate what
had happened to the Jews at her hometown Passau, Germany, she was
shocked by her findings of the close cooperation of the locals with the
Nazi regime. Instead, the local community, contrary to her findings, has
proclaimed an identity of strong resistance against the Nazi policy. She
discovered that two distinguished Paussau priests, whose names were
under data protection, denounced Jews to the Gestapo in 1936, but one
died with the reputation of a saint and the other as a resistant to the Nazi
regime. The revelation of the facts led to the accusation of monstrous
defamation by the locals. She was watched, molested and assaulted by
her co-citizens. Though her victory in court helped her regain
confidence in the German community, 137 she eventually migrated to the
U.S.
135. See XIAO ZESHENG
MUDI SHANG DE XIANFA QUANLI
70- 79 (2011).
136. Guy Hedgecoe, Spanish Left Cold over "Franco in a Fridge", DW (Aug. 19,
2013), available at http://www.dw.de/spanish-left-cold-over-franco-in-a-fridge/a-l 7029255
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014)(the case was first rejected by a Spanish judge in July 2013 and
now is pending on appeal).
137. See COULMAS, supra note 48.

PAXUE
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B. Political Figures and History Controversies
As noted above, Anja Rosmus-Wenninger only conflicted with her
local community. Reputations of dead political figures that bear more
substantial connections with present politics will be under much closer
watch by many, including the dead's families and their political allies,
who are usually powerfully equipped with sufficient social resources to
win defamation battles.
In the French case of Editions Pion, the family of the dead French
President Mitterrand accused his former private physician of breaching
medical confidentiality, and therefore invading the privacy of the dead
and his family, 138 degrading the deceased's reputation and honor. 139 In
his book Le Grand Secret, which was published shortly after
Mitterrand's death, Dr. Gubler wrote that the dead president had been
diagnosed with cancer a few months after his first election, but he
ordered concealment of his illness and issued false health bulletins. 140
The French courts upheld the accusations and restricted the book's
distribution with an interim injunction in the first instance. 141 The
family also brought civil proceedings against Dr. Gubler and others,
prohibiting the resumption of the book's publication, or deleting certain
pages and paragraphs as altemative. 142
The European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") found a
violation of Article 10 of the Convention in that the legal measures
restricting the publication of the book were not appropriate to the ends
of the French law in pursuit after balancing them with the author's free
speech rights protected by Article 10. 143 The Court recognized the
interim injunction as a justified legal measure to protect the plaintiffs'
privacy. It is rather clear in this case that posthumous publication
would have big influences on the late President's reputation and his
family pride. But, the Court defined that the disclosure is of public
interest, "in particular the public's right to be informed about any
serious illnesses suffered by the head of State, and the question whether

138. See Editions Plon v. France, App. No. 58148/00, para. 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2004),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014). A breach of confidentiality in France is a criminal offense under Article 226-13 of
the Criminal Code. See also id. para. 3.
139. Id. para. 34.
140. Id. para. 6.
141. Id. para. 12.
142. Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00, para. 14 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18,
2004), available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
143. Id.
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a person who knew that he was seriously ill was fit to hold the highest
national office." 144 The information is important to transparency of
government and there is no "pressing social need" to take the prescribed
measures against the publishing company. 145
In Mizzi v. Malta, the ECtHR quashed the judgements of Maltase
courts, finding a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 146 The Court
did not directly reject the protection of the dead Prime Minister's
reputation by the domestic courts. However, it argued that the
protection is disproportionate, particularly in the view of the dead as a
former politician and a public figure, who should be subject to wider
limits of acceptable criticisms and that the disputed article covered a
subject of public interest. 147
In the Spanish case Rosa MariaL6pe & Gutierrez, the author and
editor of a newspaper were accused of violating the right of honor of the
Moroccan King Hassan II due to their report of a drug trafficking issue,
of which the ECtHR found the Spanish state violated the free speech
rights under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights
("Convention"). 148 The Spanish courts took measures to restrict the
publication of the newspaper article that reported the suspicious
connection of the then-living King to a drug smuggling caught by
Spanish police. 149 The Court quashed the domestic decisions and ruled
that the measures taken by the Spanish authority cannot be proved that
the interference claimed was "necessary in a democratic society" and
could not meet "a pressing social need"; it simply did not find that the
144. Id. para. 44.
145. Id.
146. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-107530 (last visited Dec.
4, 2014).
147. Id. para. 38; see also Lombardo v. Malta, App. No. 7333/06, (Eur. Ct. H.R. July
27, 2007), available at http://www.pfcmalta.org/uploads/l/2/l/7/12174934/7333-06.pdf
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (ruling "the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a
politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former Correct
inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny of their words and deeds by
journalists and the public at large, and they must consequently display a greater degree of
tolerance").
148. The monarch filed the case himself but later died during domestic proceeding.
Gutierrez Suarez v. Spain, App. No. 16023/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012). Hereinafter, the
English version of the verdict will be referenced. Victory of Spanish Journalist at European
Court Is Final, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM COMM., Nov. 30, 2010, available at:
http://www.wpfc.org/?q=node/447 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
149. The alleged article mentioned similar reports that were also published in El
Mundo, Le Monde, and Herald Tribune, which stated that drug trafficking was the main
source of foreign currency for Morocco and pointed to some Moroccan politicians close to
the king. Id. para. 6.
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information disclosed was capable of causing injury to the personal
reputation of the king. 150 The Court prescribed that while journalist
reports can be presented in different ways, "it is not for the Court of
Justice or for the national jurisdictional authorities to otherwise replace
the press to say what technique must the journalists adopt." 151
The author and editor involved in the Spanish case above are not
the only authors and journalists who were punished for defaming
deceased kings and their families. In 2007, Swiss citizen Oliver Jufer
was sentenced to ten years imprisonment in Thailand for insulting King
Bhumibol Adulyadej by vandalising portraits of the monarch with black
spray-paint during a drunken spree. 152 Citizens of democracies might
have problems with the rationales to protect dead kings and state heads,
as discussion of their past activities is of public interest and important
for public discourse of state policy. Political figures of high status, such
as state heads, are obviously important historical figures (or persons in
the Israeli term), and shall be under public scrutiny. When defamation
cases concern public figures, the truth that the defendants claimed to
have spoken is relevant to the narration of public history. 153
As indicated above, re-assessment of the dead's reputation can
modify our view of the past and collective memory. In Lehideux &
lsorni v. France, 154 the French judicial authority convicted the authors
of an advertisement published in Le Monde. The text was read as
defending the memory of Marshal Petain, the famous collaborator of the
Nazi Party who was responsible for the death of many French Jews in
Nazi concentration camps. The ECtHR overruled the French decisions
and found the criminal conviction unnecessary in a democratic
society. 155 It made an important distinction between clearly established
historical facts, such as genocide and Holocaust, and historical facts that
are not clearly established, as in the instant case. 156 As a leading case,
the Court set out the rule that denial of the Holocaust and atrocities
150. Id. para. 36.
151. Id. para. 33 (reiterating its previous ruling in Bladet & Stensaas v. Norway [GC],
App. No. 21980/93, para. 63 (E. Ct. H.R. 1999)).
152. World Briefing I Asia: Thailand: Man Who Insulted King Pardoned, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
13,
2007),
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9AOOE4D9 l 33FF930A25757COA96 l 9C8B63&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3 As
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
153. Barak-Erez, supra note 29, at 95 (arguing that defamation cases in which the
defendant claims to have spoken the truth, may sometimes be the background for judgments
of historical significance).
154. Lehideuz & Isomi v. France, App. No. 55/1997/839/1045, (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1998).
155. Id. para. 58.
156. Id. para. 47.
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should be excluded from protection of Article 10 of the Convention. 157
By denying protection of revisionists and Holocaust deniers, the
Court has obviously promoted a judicial narrative and forbids further
challenges, which leads to a further question of the proper roles of court
in general. Many have doubted the roles of courts in handling cases
regarding historical controversies, questioning if courts are the right
locus to address historical events. As Barak-Erez noted, courts may
choose three roles to play: as judges and arbiters of historical events; as
narrators of history; and as students and teachers of historical lesson. 158
In my view, courts of law can nevertheless avoid to play such roles
either singly or simultaneously in handling defamation cases regarding
historical events, though their capacities are under doubt.
We observe a similar role played by a Japanese court to affirm the
official narrative, like the ECtHR, in reaffirming Japan's dark past
during the WWII. Shortly before the notorious Nanjing massacre, two
Japanese officers participated in a killing contest with swords to prove
their military bravery or brutality. Both were executed after the war in
Nanjing for their committed war crimes by the Nanjing War Crimes
Tribunal. The story was reported in 1971 by two Japanese newspapers,
Mainichi Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun. The dead's families sued for
posthumous defamation, claiming fabrication of the story. 159 The
Japanese court rejected their claims and confirmed the trueness of the
reports, despite some minor mistakes. The case concerns Japan's war
crimes in China that are well-established historical facts and unable to
be overturned in the defamation case.
It is no doubt that the dead's families are the strongest defenders of
their reputation since they are directly impacted in their daily life.
Negative reputation of the dead will have passive influence on the
living's life and repute. In the French case, Fondation FrancoJaponaise dite Sasakawa vs. Karoline Postel-Vinay, 160 Sasakawa
Franco-Japanese Foundation accused French historian Karoline Postel157. Id. (prescribing that denial or revision of "clearly established historical facts such as the Holocaust - ... would be removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article
17.").
158. Barak-Erez, supra, note 29, at 91-100.
159. Mainichi Shimbun and another newspaper Asahi Shimbun. Suit Denying Pair 's
Wartime Beheading Spree Fails, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE (Aug. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2005/08/24/national/suit-denying-pairs-wartimebeheading-spree-fails/#.Uee836xoVtO (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
160. Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI] [ordinary court oforiginal jurisdiction] Paris,
Sept.
22,
2010
(Fr.),
available
at
http://www.concemedhistorians.org/content_files/file/LE/l 84.pdf (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/4

32

Zhao: Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy: Hist

2014] Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Privacy

71

Vinay for slurring on its respectability. Postel-Vinay sent an e-mail to
participants of a symposium held on the big social event of the 150th
anniversary of the diplomatic relations between Japan and France, of
which the Foundation was a sponsor. The controversial e-mail was
entitled "Sasakawa, a war criminal to celebrate 150 years of FrancoJapanese Diplomacy?" 161 The author explained that together with other
sixteen historians and academics, she felt it was "quite inappropriate
that a foundation fashioning its own name after that of a class A war
criminal should sponsor such a gathering." 162 The Paris District Court
found part of the e-mail text libellous, but dismissed the case due to a
successful defense of good faith by the author. 163
C. Rehabilitation and Posthumous Justice
As noted above, the Japanese court rejected the defamatory
accusation of the journalists and affirmed the war crimes of the two
executed military officers. However, Japanese courts have been very
reluctant to deliver judgments in favor of the victims of Chinese
comfort women, as some survivors have sued for remedies of past
suffering. 164 In a collective sense, whether victims of war crimes,
atrocities and the Holocaust are recognized by their victim status and
offered proper compensations is important not only as a matter of
justice, but also as a matter of human dignity and respect. The living
victims should not be hurt a second time and those dead should not have
their names lost in the dust of history. This is especially true for the
dead victims of war atrocities during the Second World War, either
conducted by Nazi Germany or by the former Soviet Union.
The Katyn tragedy shocked the world by the annihilation of almost
a whole generation of Polish elites by the Russian military after its
invasion. The tragedy left a deep wound in Polish people and human
history. It is after the collapse of the Soviet Union that the truth came
out. On November 26, 2010, the Russian State Duma issued a formal
161. Id.
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id.
164. After 1996 such victims are defined by United Nations as forced slaves. Many
Korean victims acquired remedies and formal apology from the Japanese government. See
Japan Court Backs 3 Brothel Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 1998), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/l 998/04/28/world/japan-court-backs-3-brothelvictims.html?src=pm (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). However, the law suits lodged by Chinese
victims ended only with recognition of the historical tragedy, but without any compensation
since, among other justifications, the Japanese Supreme Court deferred to a 1972 bilateral
treaty signed by the Chinese Communist government to abandon war compensation. PEIPEI
QIU, supra note 45, at 175.
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statement on the tragedy, declaring that "[i]t is necessary to continue
studying the archives, verifying the lists of victims, restoring the good
names of those who perished in Katyn and other places and uncovering
the circumstances of the tragedy." 165 However, when some surviving
family members of the deceased victims tried to seek the whereabouts
of their beloved, time and again they were confronted with obstacles
from the present Russian authorities. They were refused further help
and serious replies from the Russian authorities, 166 and an official
investigation ended prematurely and the related documents were
classified afterwards. The case finally ended up in ECtHR to which the
Russian state authorities still refused to provide key documents relating
to the case upon the Court's request. The Chamber first found
violations of some applicants' rights not to be subjected to inhumane or
degrading treatment protected under Article 3 of the Convention, as
well as a violation of Article 38 of the Convention. 167 The Chamber
commented that the Court "is struck by the apparent reluctance of the
Russian authorities to recognize the reality of the Katyn massacre"
noting the fact that after the discontinuation of the investigation, "the
Russian prosecutors consistently rejected the applicants' requests for
rehabilitation of their relatives." 168 The Grand Chamber upheld the
Chamber decision on a violation of Article 38, but overruled its decision
of an Article 3 violation by the Russian State authorities. 169
It seems that requesting rehabilitation from a foreign state is not
easy for many reasons. Rehabilitation of dead victims consequent to
communist political convictions was not an easy thing either even in
their motherlands. In Kurzac v. Poland, a Polish-American tried to
rehabilitate his deceased brother - a victim of the Polish Communist
suppression - and to restore his own family's reputation. 170 However,
the legal procedures had lasted for five years and were unbearable to the
applicant, so that the case was eventually brought to ECtHR for a
violation of Article 6-1 (hearing within a reasonable time). 171 In the
admissibility judgment, the ECtHR decided that "the result of the
165. See Janowiec v. Russia, App. nos. 55508/07 & 29520/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-127684 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
166. See id para. 39.
167. See generally id
168. Id. para. 45-46.
169. Id. para. 50.
170. Kurzac v. Poland, App. No. 31382/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 2001), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
171. Id para. 1. In this case, the Court considered the possibility of extending its
jurisdiction to cases of atrocity that happened more than half a century ago.
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proceedings in issue was decisive for rights which by their very nature
were civil, namely, the applicant's right to enjoy a good reputation and
his right to protect the honour of his family and restore its good
name." 172 The Court therefore puts the reputation of a surviving family
under its consideration in the case of rehabilitation of dead victims.
In Spain, the 1977 Amnesty Law has blocked the road both to
rehabilitate the deceased victims of the brutal Civil War and long
dictatorship, and to condemn the responsible perpetrators, whether dead
or alive. The law has been passed consequent to a compromise made
among different social forces to facilitate the democratic transition. 173
But the amnesty law was defined by the UN as incompatible with the
International Human Rights law with respect to crimes against humanity
that should enjoy no statute oflimitations. 174
A Spanish judge's effort to apply such international human rights
law was impeded when the Spanish Amnesty Law was under scrutiny.
Judge Garzon issued the historical arrest warrant of former Chilean
dictator Augusto Pinochet and contributed to legal proceedings against
the perpetrator. 175 He also tried to apply the same standard to Spain's
historical crimes, when some family members of the missing asked the
Audiencia Nacional (National Court) to investigate the whereabouts of
their remains for a decent burial. 176 Garzon conferred his jurisdiction to
the local courts to answer such inquiries. 177 But this caused chaos and
he was accused of flouting the Amnesty Law and committing the crime
of prevaricaci6n. 178 He was eventually exonerated by the Spanish
Supreme Court, but the decision ended the legal approach of Civil War
172. Decision as to the Admissibility of Application no. 31382/96, para. 6 (Eur. Ct.
R.R.
May
25,
2000),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ sites/eng/pages/ search.aspx?i=OO 1-5 297 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
173. Or the pact of oblivion (el pacto de olvido). See Teresa Fernandez Paredes,

Transitional Justice in Democratization Processes: the Case of Spain from an International
Point of View, 1 INT'L J. RULE L., TRANSITIONAL JUST. & HUM. RTS. 124, 125 (2010);
Sumalla, supra note 52, at 733- 37. This law was counter-balanced recently by a new
Historical Memory Law in Spain (Ley de la memoria historica). See Sumalla, supra note
52, at 737-43.
174. See the relative comment from the UN Human Rights Office. See Spain Must
Lift Amnesty for Franco Era Crimes-U.N, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Feb. 10, 2012),
available at http://www.trust.org/item/?map=spain-must-lift-amnesty-for-franco-era-crimesun (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
175. Naomi Robt-Arriaza, The Spanish Civil War, Amnesty, and the Trials of Judge
16
AM.
Soc'v
INT'L
L.
(July
25 ,
2012),
available
at
Garzon,
http://www.asi l .org/insights/volume/ 16/issue/24/spanish-civil-war-amnesty-and-trialsjudge-garzon (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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Era claims. 179
This reaction indicates the difficulties in the
implementation of the 2007 Law of Historical Memory, which
addresses the need to honor the victims of the Civil War and Franco
dictatorship and to provide them with reparation. 180
What the living sought for the deceased are posthumous dignity
and justice in the sense that they should have not been wronged. The
deceased victims' names should be cleaned of political smears. The
deceased should not die with wrongly charged crimes. In this sense,
rehabilitation of the deceased victims relates more to the concept of
justice, or historical justice, and historical truth or correct historical
narrative. 181 Even deceased victims have the moral rights to truth,
justice and reparation in a fair community and this explains why the
British Government recently decided that the army should not have
executed soldiers for cowardice in WWI and posthumously pardoned
the deceased. 182 Similarly, the Americans have apologized for the
mistreatments of Japanese migrants during WWII and of indigenous
Indians for past injustice. 183
Lastly, one must note that the rehabilitation of the dead victims in
the above cases is possible because of changed social morals or ethos
consequent to political changes or the advancement of humanity. This
will be discussed further in Section VI, which illustrates how political
change and cultural shift have influenced posthumous reputation and
our understandings of the past.
D. Posthumous Privacy and Individual Dignity

The dead may be no more, but their past deeds are kept among the
memories of those who know them in person or who have heard of
them, or who read their diaries, letters or memoranda.
More
importantly, their images and likeness, as a crucial part of their past
existence and the living's impression, can be kept in various forms such
as photographs, newspapers, archival documents, films, or most
recently, in digital forms on the Internet. In particular, their names and
voices can be used commercially; their images and likeness may be
179. Id.
180. See Sumalla, supra note 52, at 743-44.
181. In this regard, reparation of injustice, according to the United Nations, includes
five forms, namely: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, guarantees of non-repetition,
and satisfaction. Satisfaction includes symbolic reparation or posthumous rehabilitation. See
G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 112 at para. 22(d).
182. MACMILLAN, supra note 4, at 28.
183. See generally Janna Thompson, Historical Injustice and Reparation: Justifying
Claims of Descendants, 112 ETHICS 114 (2001).
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exhibited in history museums for public knowledge; or statues and
monuments may be erected to keep their memory alive in community
life; or foundations, cities and streets may be named after the deceased
for their remembrance or collective memory.
In many occasions, such uses may cause conflicts with their
surviving family's interest as well as the dead's privacy and reputation
(or in abstract, dignity). For instance, the likeness could be used in a
defamatory way, or the dead's families are not willing to disclose such
materials to the public, whether for commercial use or for public
knowledge; or they are reluctant for such disclosure because the end
products are not in favor of the dead. The most extremist version of this
category of "defamation" is the defamatory treatment of the likeness of
political figures to present political opinions. When the deceased are
treated as the icons or pride of a national state and under protection,
such "mistreatment" can be handled seriously.
During the 1989 Beijing Student Protest in June, to advocate their
anti-dictatorship opinion, three young Chinese threw ink-filled eggs to
deface the great portrait of Mao hung on the Tian'an Gate overseeing
the Tiananmen Square. They were caught and sentenced to long-term
imprisonments for crimes of anti-revolution and defamation of the
founder of the communist state. 184 We can find a similar situation in
Turkey where acts against the late Ataturk were punished by Law No.
5816 with harsh imprisonment. 185 Many journalists and historians have
been accused of defamation of Ataturk in the past under this special
legislation, which has been criticized by international society. 186

184. Mao was and still is the icon and pride of the national state to many Chinese
today. The three convicts got, respectively, sixteen, twenty and life imprisonment. China Is
Accused of Torturing 3 Who Defaced Mao Portrait, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 1992), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/01 /world/china-is-accused-of-torturing-3-who-defacedmao-portrait.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); Mao Portrait Protesters Reunited, RADIO FREE
ASIA (June 21, 2010), available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/portrait062 l 2010110340.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
185. McCRACKEN, supra note 55, at 31.
186. See Prosecutor Investigates A TV Show For Defamation Of Ataturk, BIANET (June
13, 2008, 11 :30 AM), available at http://www.bianet.org/english/religion/107620prosecutor-investigates-a-tv-show-for-defamation-of-ataturk (last visited Dec. 3, 2014);
Julia Wetherell, EU Fines Turkey for Blocking Google Sites, TECHPRESIDENT (Dec. 19,
2012), available at http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/23289/eu-fines-turkey-blockinggoogle-sites (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); Nagehan Alci, Journalist to Sue for Defamation
After Ataturk Remarks, TODAY'S ZAMAN (Nov. 11, 2011, 5:30 PM), available at
http://www.todayszaman.com//news-262347-joumalist-to-sue-for-defamation-after-ataturkremarks.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). For a more detailed discussion, see Antoon De
Baets, Defamation Cases Against Historians, 41 HIST. & THEORY 346, 349
(2002)(particularly note 12).
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The likeness of the dead can be well protected by law in Western
democracies under privacy law, especially when the proprietary
interests of the dead's likeness and name are of concern. In the U.S.,
the dead's images or likeness could be protected indirectly, as surviving
families claim invasions of their own privacy or reputation against
disclosure or appropriation. Journalist Allen Favish was denied access
to posthumous photographs taken of the late Vincent Foster at the death
scene and during the autopsy. 187 Foster was a high-ranking White
House lawyer involved in the investigation of Clinton family's scandal
of Whitewater Real Estate Venture. He was found to have committed
suicide following the official investigation. Favish suspected that the
denial to the requested photos of the deceased was part of a cover-up of
the murder. The U.S. government refused his request on the ground of
protection of the privacy of Foster's family. They explained that
disclosure of such photographs would traumatize the family and invade
their privacy. The Supreme Court of the U.S. ruled that the privacy
interests of the family trump the public's interest in seeing the pictures
of his death scene. 188
But, the dead's privacy and reputation were not without
consideration of the Chief Justice. In Swidler & Berlin v. United
States, 189 Justice William Rehnquist, on behalf of the majority,
concluded that to assume a dead person's interest in reputation ends
upon his death is unreasonable, which the dissenting Justice Sandra
O'Connor also agreed on. 190 In MacDonald v. Time, District Judge
Sarokin said that such an idea, that a man's defamed reputation dies
with him, is to ignore the realities of life and the bleak legacy which he
leaves behind. 191
Many European jurisdictions offer direct protection by statutory
law. Appropriation of the dead's likeness as invasion of posthumous
privacy is forbidden in Italy. The Italian magazine Chi purchased the
exclusive right to publish the pictures taken shortly after Princess
187. See generally Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
188. See id. at 170-72.
189. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998); see also Raymond
Iryami, Give the Dead Their Day in Court: Implying a Private Cause of Action for
Defamation of the Dead from Criminal Libel Statues, 9 FORDHAM lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition for decedents'
reputation).
190. See generally Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 411 (O'Connor, J. dissenting)
(agreeing that normally the attorney-client privilege survives the death of a client).
191. MacDonald v. Time, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (D.N.J. 1983) ("Why should a
claim for a damaged leg survive one's death, where a claim for a damaged name does not.
After death, the leg cannot be healed, but the reputation can.").
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Diana's fatal accident and obtained the findings of the autopsy. The
Italian court regarded it as a violation of the dead's dignity and found
that the disclosure was not justified by the need of free information of
the public. 192 Further dissemination of such information may face
criminal punishments, such as imprisonment for up to two years. 193
According to Madoff, after the death of Saddam Hussein, even the
Italian special authority gave a press release to caution the media to
respect the dead's dignity. 194
Protection of the deceased's last dignity, in particular their death
scene pictures, has been recognized by other EU countries. In Hachette
Filipacchi Associes v. France, the dead's widow and children accused
several companies of an infringement of the right to respect of their
private life after the companies disclosed a photograph of the murdered
Prefect Claude Brignac in Ajaccio for commercial use. The photograph
was supplementary to an article and displayed his dead body lying on
the ground. 195 The French Court of Cassation concluded that because
the photograph clearly indicated the body and face of the murdered, the
publication showed disregard for human dignity and therefore the
publication was illegal. 196 In replying to the ECtHR, the French
Government explicitly expressed that though the publication of that
article concerned a matter of public interest, it affected the dignity of a
civil servant, which is part of "the hard core" of his rights, as well as the
private life of his family. 197
In the Slovak Republic, courts judged in similar ways to protect the
privacy of the dead and their family. For example, in Weiss vs. R., a. s.,
several photographs of a mother's dead body and others ante mortem
were published, together with some excerpts of her suicide letter. The
deceased was Ms. Marcela Weissova, wife of Slovak politician Mr.
Peter Weiss. Her son accused the publisher of violating his own and his
late mother's personality rights. The Slovakia judiciary authorities
acknowledged that the publication of photographs of the dead body
violated Article 15 CC of the Civil Code, which protects posthumous

192. MADOFF, supra note 28, at 128.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Hachette Filipacchi Associes v. France, App. No. 71111/01, para. 7-11 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. June 14, 2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=OOl-81066 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
196. Id. para. 19.
197. Id. para. 11 (finding no violation of free speech rights of the applicant company
under Article 10 of the Convention).
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personality rights and therefore ordered remedies. 198
Not only is dignity of the dead under legal protection when the
dead's likeness is in controversy, but also when the related economic
benefits are of much closer concern of the living families. This
concerns the economic perspective of the dead's name, likeness, etc.
Again, Princess Diana would be bothered if she had the chance to know
the fierce legal battles fought under the name of her remembrance, of
which millions of dollars were at stake. 199 A similar story happened to
Martin Luther King, whose family charged heavily on the use of his
likeness, name and the famous "I have a dream" speech. 200
German law, as Rosler suggested, differentiated more clearly
between protection of reputation and privacy as dignity and as property
in particular in the 1999 Marlene Dietrich Decision. 201 It is the first
time that the German Federal Court rendered damages to posthumous
invasion of personality on the ground of commercial exploitation of the
decedent's name, voice or image, which was part of marketing strategy
about Marlene Dietrich. This involved various products such as bags, tshirts, watches, calling cards, pins, etc. The Constitutional Court of
Germany upheld the decision and affirmed the inclusion of commercial
aspects of personality rights under constitutional protection. 202

E. Biography Writing and Posthumous Disputes
Biography writing matters not only to the living, but also to the
dead because this is an important means to recount their life and

198. The Constitutional Court upheld the decision with a monetary compensation for
the invasion of the deceased mother's privacy Weiss vs. R., a. s., 7.07.2009 (US), III. US
185/09-24 (Slovak Republic) (the case is briefed to the author by his student research
assistant, Mr. Martin Duchac ).
199. See Matthew Magee, Court Rules that Newspaper does not have to Identify
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
1,
2011,
9:54
PM),
available
at
Commenters,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/mar/01 /sue-commenters-libel-daily-mail (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014); Heather Timmons, Diana Charity Halts Grants, Citing Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES
(July 12, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07 /12/world/diana-charity-haltsgrants-citing-lawsuit.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); Marius Meland, Princess Diana Fund,
Franklin Mint Settle Trademark Dispute, LAw360 (Nov. 11, 2004, 12:00 AM), available at
http://www.law360.com/articles/2540/princess-diana-fund-franklin-mint-settle-trademarkdispute (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
200. Jonathan Turley, Cashing in on Martin Luther King Jr., Los ANGELES TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/22/opinion/oe-turley22
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (King's family winning landmark case against USA Today and
CBS for the illegal use of King's speech without paying them); see also MADOFF supra note
28, at 9-10.
201. Rosler, supra note 77, at 181.
202. Id.
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achievement. As Craik pointed out, many dead even got more famous
after their death through successful biographies. 203 Some people will
get their autobiographies ready before death to prevent defamatory
statements; others may hire professional writers to put down their
stories before death, 204 as Apple's founder Steven Jobs made such an
arrangement with the author of his biography. 205 After death, living
families may also hire professional writers to complete the story of the
deceased for many reasons. Or, biographies of the dead could be
written by many without the consent of the dead before death and of
their families after death. These two circumstances can both lead to
controversies.
The Canadian case Turgeon v. Michaud lasted for seven years
because of the vague assignment of the author's rights upon writing a
biography for a famous Quebec businessman. The dead' s family
commissioned author Pierre Turgeon to write Desrosier's biography in
order to promote business by telling the stories of the founder and how
he managed to establish a commercially successful enterprise. 206 The
timeline set out in the initial agreement was not respected and the
writing was delayed several times. At last the author's manuscript was
not to the heirs' satisfaction, who decided not to publish it.
Nevertheless, the author sought to publish the draft at another
publishing company other than the agreed one. The Quebec Superior
Court issued a permanent injunction against Turgeon, halting him from
publishing the manuscript. The trial judge claimed that the deceased's
heir had the right to refuse to publish the manuscript and the author
could not publish any content that is based on the confidential
information provided by the deceased's family. 207
Biographers are likely to disclose private matters that others would
have no chance to know. This influences the deceased's' reputations as

203. CRAIK, supra note 10, at 182-86 (arguing that biography may extend a dead's
reputational network and biographical reputational network ultimately serves as the major
locus of the posthumous reputational network).
204. Id. at 190 (an example of "pre-posthumous tasks" is Thomas Hardy, who spent
years ghostwriting his official biography and then covered it as his wife's memoir).
205. With an agreement that Jobs would not interfere with the contents of his own
biography. Nick Bilton, One on One: Walter Isaacson, Biographer of Steve Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES:
BITS
BLOG
(Nov.
18,
2011,
9:41
AM),
available
at
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011 /1 l /18/one-on-one-walter-isaacson-biographer-of-stevejobs/?_r=O (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
206. Alexandra Steele, Once Upon a Time, There was a Manuscript, CETNRE CDP
CAPITAL, available at http://www.robic.ca/admin/pdf/537/173.14.pdf (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
207. Id.
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well as their families' reputations. Francis Russell, an American writer
and biographer, was confronted by the heirs of ex-president Harding
who sought injunction from Ohio court to exclude the use of love letters
of the dead in his book The Shadow of Blowing Grave regarding
Harding. These love letters were from Mrs. Phillips who had had an
affair with Harding for more than fifteen years and was persuaded by
Russell to relent. These letters were confiscated by an Ohio Court and
they remained under a protective order until 2014. 208 They cover the
controversial period regarding Harding's nomination for the Republican
presidency in 1920, when it was too late to change the nominee upon
knowledge of the affair by the Republican Party, which sought ways to
cover the affair. 209 The author protested by leaving the spaces for the
citations from the letters merely blank in his published book. 210 Yet
during Harding's full term, voters never knew anything about his
extramarital affairs, though he suffered multiple posthumous
indignities. 211
The above two cases show the importance of using unpublished
materials in biographical writings and the big impacts of legal
interferences on historical studies under copyrights. 212 Still, if a
biography is not written in favor of the dead, their families may seek
damages, injunctions, remedies and an obligatory formal apology to
protect themselves and the dead. In China, the children of the deceased
ex-prime minister Cheng Y onggui sued historian Wu Shi and won the
case with remedies of emotional distress and a formal apology from the
author and publisher. 213 Wu described the deceased as "the peasant of
Chairman Mao" and listed his previous deeds unknown to the public in

208. Francis Russell, A Naughty President, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (1982),
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/l 982/jun/24/a-naughty-president/
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
209. John H. Summers, What Happened to Sex Scandals? Politics and Peccadilloes,
Jefferson to Kennedy, 87 J. AM. HIST. 825, 836 (2000).
210. The letters are confiscated under the protection of common law copyright
interests of the heirs. See John Dean, The Harding Affair: Evidence or Racism Rising,
FINDLAW (Sept. 18, 2009), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20090918.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (detailing the story regarding Harding in his interview).
211. Summers, supra note 210, at 836.
212. For a general discussion regarding unpublished expressions in biographical
writing without consent of the copyright holders in the United Stated, see Bilder, supra note
37.
213. Chen Mingliangyu Beijing qingnianbao he Wu Shi QianfanMingyuquan An
[Chen Mingliang V. Wu Shi & Beijing Youth
Newspaper] (Beijing No. 1 Interm. Ct. Dec. 29, 2003) (China), available at
http://www.qinquan.info/138v9.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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a biography. 214 Chen's living family would not accept such a negative
account of the former politician with a good repute. Even if true, such
writing denigrates the reputation of the dead. The adjudicating court
ruled that the author used sources, such as private memos, personal
interviews, etc., which are not official and un-authoritative. 215 Although
the author had been cautious and acted with due care in selecting
materials and writing, the Chinese courts still demanded the use of
certain sources and materials in favor of the deceased. 216
Closely related to biographical writing are novels or fictions that
are based on real stories of the deceased, but taken as defamatory
against the deceased by their families. Such writings and narratives
attract disputes from the dead's families or even agitate them because
many audiences know clearly whom those characters are in real life. In
a famous German case regarding the Klaus Mann's novel MephistoNovel of a Career, Mann portrayed a character attributed to the wellknown, controversial German actor and theatre director Gustaf
Griindgens (1899-1963). 217 The heir of Griindgens filed a defamation
suit and the German Constitutional Court judged in favor of the dead,
finding that the defamation overrided constitutional values. 218 The
problem of such artistic works lies in the blurs of facts and imaginations
that may mislead the audience to mistake fictions as reality of the
past. 219
No wonder Rosier questioned: "what would happen if such a
fusion of fiction and fact took place on a large scale, changing even the
perception of history"? 220 This is the rationale behind the Brazilian
Civil Code, which requires works of a biographical nature to have
consent from their subjects before public release. This obviously
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. In another case, a young Chinese biographer, based on accessible university
archives, depicted some notorious acts of a famous scholar, the former president of that
university, during China's Culture Revolution. The presiding judge in this case explicitly
expressed that memos included in such archives putting down people's self-and-mutual
criticisms shall not be used for historical studies like author's work. Feng Boqun
3 DANGAN
Yinyong Dangan Rechu de Yichang Guansi
CHUNQIU
10- 15 (2006).
217. Rosler,supranote 114,at 154-55, 174-78.
218. Id. at 155.
219. Take the Oscar-winning film Braveheart for example, which has been criticized
by many historians of its inaccurate narrative. See Elizabeth Ewan, Braveheart.; Roy Roy, 4
AM. HIST. REV. 1219, 1219-21 (1995), available at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/
burt/Medieval%20cinema%20recommended/AHR%20Braveheart. pdf (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
220. Rosier, supra note 114, at 156.
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influences contents of biographical works so that they "end up being
eulogistic to the people they portray." 221 For instance, Ruy Castro was
accused by the relatives of the late footballer, World Cup champion
Garrincha, of libel for his description of the deceased' s penis length. 222
Defamation suits are a big threat to journalists and biographers who are
willing to reveal the secrets and realities of the deceased that were once
hidden for various reasons.
If biographers are restricted in their writings in using unpublished
expressions, then the value of biographical writings - in particular in
view of their contribution to history - is shaky on the whole.
F. Religious Honor and Group Identity

With respect to defamation of religion, many will recall the Danish
newspaper Jyllands-Posten that printed cartoons portraying Muhammad
in a less favorable way. The case was defeated by the Danish court, 223
although publishers of the same cartoon were punished in Jordan,
Indonesia and Belarus224 which shows a different tolerance of free
speech. The recent example is an Egyptian Christian teacher who was
accused of defamation of Mohammed and Islam by her students and
their parents. 225 She was eventually removed from her job. No doubt,
defamation of the dead prophet and religious leaders is somehow
defamation of the accusers' religious identity, and therefore themselves.
In jurisdictions where defamation of religion is punished, historians
have been silenced and journalists have to conduct self-censorship to
221. Rafael Spuldar, New Law Set to Ease the Way for Biographies in Brazil, XINDEX
(May 9, 2013), available at http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/05/new-law-set-toease-the-way-for-biographies-in-brazil/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
222. ALEX BELLOS, FUTEBOL: THE BRAZILIAN WAY OF LIFE 105 (Bloombury Publ'g
Pie. 2009) (ironically, it was regarded by the adjudicating judge not as degrading, but as a
pride of most Brazilians in that country).
223. AFP, Muslim Cartoon Case Fails to Reach Denmark's Top Court, CANADA.COM
(Oct.
21,
2008),
available
at
http://www.canada.com/topics/
news/world/story.html?id=c25b9b8a-2906-453f-a67 l-l a4a 13 7fe6 l f (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
224. Meagan McElroy, Denmark Court Dismissed Lawsuit Against Editors over
Muhammad Cartoons, JURIST (Oct. 26, 2011, 12:00 AM), available at
http://jurist.org/thisday/2011 I I 0/danish-court-dismissed-lawsuit-against-editors-overmuhammad-cartoons.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); see also L. Bennett Graham,
Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism?, 23 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 69, 69-73 (2009);
see also Belnap, supra note 49, at 638-42.
225. Pamela Geller, Sharia in Action: Christian Teacher in Egypt Accused of
'Defaming Islam' Goes on Hunger Strike, ATLAS SHRUGS (May 13, 2013, 8:43 AM),
available at http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_ shrugs/2013/05/sharia-in-actionchristian-teacher-in-egypt-accused-of-defaming-islam-goes-on-hunger-strike.html
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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avoid troubles. 226 Such official reaction can even influence publishers
from Western democracies who have to take into account negative
consequences. For instance, a student editor from University of Illinois
and an author from Cambridge University confronted aftereffects of
their reproduction of the famous cartoon against Muhammad,
implicating potential self-censorship by both university authorities. 227
We shall not be surprised to observe similar cases even in
European democracies that should have been more tolerant to extreme
speeches. These cases usually stir up agitation and sentimental distress
within religious communities. In the controversial Giniewski v. France,
the author published an article in a Paris newspaper that was deemed
racially defamatory against the Christian community. 228 The author
was accused for condemning Christianity's historical anti-Semitism
while claiming a direct :relation to the horrors at Auschwitz with the
core doctrines of Catholic faith, which undermines "the honour and
character of Christians and, more specifically, the Catholic
community."229 In the subsequent legal proceedings, the criminal
charge was dropped, but the civil complaint was upheld with remedies
awarded and a public statement of court ruling ordered. 230
The case went to the ECtHR for breaching the author's free speech
rights. The applicant claimed that his speech was subject to stricter
control regarding a sensitive religious matter and the French judicial
interpretation of his article was not in accordance with the original texts,
whose intention was to contribute to the public debate on the origins of
anti-Semitism and the extermination of the Jews. 231 The ECtHR
admitted that the interference was prescribed by law, and followed a
legitimate aim to protect the reputation of others (the Christian
community at stake). 232 The Court realized the fact of the broadened
margin of appreciation of its contracting states, due to the "absence of a
uniform European conception of the requirements of the protection of
226. See Graham, supra note 225; see also ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, ENDING THE CHILLING EFFECT: WORKING TO REAL CRIMINAL LIBEL
AND INSULT LA ws 97 (2004) (in many Eastern Europe and Central Asia countries, journalists
are actively convicted and prosecuted by state authorities to encourage self-censorship).
227. IVAN HARE & JAMES WEINSTEIN, EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 312 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2010).
228. Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00, para. 14 (E. Ct. H.R. Apr. 31, 2006),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-72216 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
229. Id. para. 15.
230. Id. para. 18-23.
231. Id. para. 27-28.
232. Id. para. 38-42.
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the rights of others in relation to attacks on their religious
convictions. "233 It admitted that a proper decision was within its
jurisdiction to decide on the pressing social need and proportionality of
interference in balancing different interests. 234
The Court concluded that the defamation accusation is ill grounded
on the texts of the article. It held that the author made a contribution to
the debate of a particular doctrine, which is open to further discussion
by others. 235 The Court could not find attacks on religious beliefs even
though it involved a religious doctrine and the gravity of the matter such
as the Holocaust, and the author's article is not gratuitously offensive,
or insulting, and did not incite disrespect or hatred or cast doubt on
clearly established historical facts. 236 Therefore, in the Court's view,
the interference was not necessary in a democratic society and the
charge of defamation of the Christian community did not confront a
pressing social need. 237 Though the criminal charge was acquitted and
the civil decision ordered a remedy of merely 1 FRF in damages and
publication of a notice of the ruling, the involvement of a criminal
offence per se amounted to a deterrent effect and the sanction appeared
to be disproportionate in the Court's view. 238
Though this case did not involve the dead' s reputation, it
eventually reflects the never-modest reactions from religious groups,
including threatening dissents with defamation petitions, either criminal
or civil. In this case, Christians are no different from Muslims in
defending their beliefs. Not so long ago, Robert Katz wrote in his book
Death in Rome, which was subsequently turned into a film Massacre in
Rome (1973), that then deceased Pope Pius XII knew the planned
executions of Italians nineteen hours before the event. The killings
were in reprisal of the deaths of Germans in Rome due to a partisan
attack. The Vatican denied Katz's allegation of the Pope's silence. 239 A
niece of the Pope lodged the case in the Italian courts claiming
defamation of her uncle's memory. Katz lost his criminal case and was
sentenced to fourteen months imprisonment, which was eventually set

233. Giniewski, App. No. 64016/00, para. 44.
234. Id.
235. See id. para. 50.
236. See id. para. 51-52.
237. See id. para. 53.
238. Giniewski, App. No. 64016/00, para.14.
239.
See
Robert
Katz,
TELEGRAPH,
available
at
http://www.telegraph.eo.uk/news/obituaries/religion-obituaries/8144130/Robert-Katz.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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aside following an amnesty in 1980. 240
The Italian judges in charge carried out an investigation of
historical event themselves for two years, trying to find out what really
happened on March 23rd and 24th of 1943. They travelled around Italy
and Germany to interview witnesses. 241 The local court concluded that
the "one and only truth" is that Pius XII did not know anything about
the planned reprisal, at least no proof could be shown to the court. 242
The Appeal Court quashed the decision of the first instance court and
decided not to get into any historical ascertainment of truth. It granted
the historian "an almost absolute immunity on the basis of Article 3 3 of
the Italian Constitution." 243
However, the Court of Cassation
overturned this ruling and Katz's immunity was abolished. The case
was sent back to the Appeal Court of Rome, which ruled against Katz
and restated the "truth" established by the local court. According to
Resta and Zeno-Zencovich, the final decision is extremely long and
more like a historical treatise than a judicial opinion, and the court has
somehow established an official, authoritative version of the story to
rep lace Katz's findings. 244
G. Holocaust Deniers and Revisionists

We must, when appreciating Rosmus-Wenninger's courage and
achievements in revealing historical truth, 245 pay attention to a different
category of historical studies that are not favoured by many state laws
and communities, as well as historians. History revisionists and
Holocaust deniers belong to this category in advocating different
versions of the dark sides of human history such as war crimes,
genocides and atrocities against humanity and concluded with clearly
established historical facts. 246 Their expressions have been strictly
240. See id.; see also WEBER, supra note 46 (another version of the story is that the
Supreme Court of Italy threw out the case after several appeals ten years later); see also
Emma Brown, Robert Katz, 77, Wrote History of WWII Massacre in Italy, WASH. POST,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/2 l/AR2010102105984.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
241. See Giorgio Resta & Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, Judicial Truth and Historical
Truth : The Case of the Ardeatine Quarries Massacre , 31 L. & HIST. Rev. 844, 877 (2013)
for a more detailed analysis of the case.
242. See id. (the Court's role in finding historical truth would be under critiques of
many historians and lawyers); see also discussion infra Section VI.
243. Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 877.
244. See id. at 878.
245. See discussion infra Section IV.A for her story.
246. See Lehideux & Isomi v. France, App. No. 1045/839, 1997 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on
H.R. 55 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (ruling speeches denying Holocaust are not protected by
Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights).

Published by SURFACE, 2014

47

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 4

86

Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 42:1

restricted in most W estem democracies whose laws directly treated such
expressions as crimes against humanity and human dignity, 247 even in
the case that such expressions are presented as academic discourse or an
extreme form of freedom of expression. This is in particular the case in
countries whose people experienced such tragedies.
When Garaudy challenged the orthodoxies of the Holocaust
against Jews and the existence of Hilter's final solution in his book The
Founding Myth of Modern Israel, he was found guilty of denial of
crimes against humanity, racially defamatory statements, and incitement
to racial hatred. 248 Before the ECtHR, Garaudy claimed that his views
were not revisionist and his book was a political piece of work, instead
of historical, questioning Israeli policies. He also complained that his
book had been misunderstood and distorted by French Courts. 249
Garaudy submitted to the Court that the 24 bis of Act of 29 July 1881
Law, the French Freedom of Press Act, created "a censorship
mechanism that wrongfully restricted freedom of expression. " 250
The Court reiterated that justification of a pro-Nazi policy is
against the Convention's fundamental values and could not be allowed
to enjoy the protection afforded under Article 10. 251 It regarded the
author's expressions and ideas in the book not as historical research
akin to a quest for the truth, but as trying to rehabilitate the NationalSocialist regime and accusing victims of falsifying history. It concluded
that "denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most
serious forms of racial defamation of Jews and of incident to hatred of
them."252
But the latest decision of the Court shows a different tendency on a
similar issue: the Armenian genocide, which has been long debated by
history scholars all through the world and the official history of Turkey
247. See Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment The Quest for
Truth in a Free Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV 35, 77 (1997).
248. See Garaudy v. France, App. No.65831/01 (E. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2003), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-23829 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014). Exclusion of protection of free speech rights of Holocaust denial and other similar
speeches from Article 10 of the Convention, according to some scholars, is not justified and
the case law of ECtHR shall be changed. See, e.g., Hannes Cannie & Dirk Voorhoof, The
Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human Rights Convention: An
Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection?, 29 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM.
RTs. 54, 83 (201 l)("Applying the abuse clause in order to deal with and legitimize the
criminalization of the worst kinds of speech is not a desirable project for the future
development of democracy in Europe.").
249. See Garaudy, App. No.65831/01, para. 17-18.
250. Id. para 20.
251. See id. para. 22.
252. Id. para. 23.
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is under constant criticism. In Perincek v. Switzerland, the Court denied
the genocide from falling into the legal concept of "genocide" precisely
defined by the International court of Justice and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and thus not convinced by the Swiss
court's decision. 253 It regarded the plaintiffs as engaging in speech of a
historical, legal and political nature as part of a heated debate. 254
Many jurisdictions have special memory laws to punish speeches
of deniers of the Holocaust, atrocities, war crimes and massacres and
In Europe, negationism is punishable in
related revisionists. 255
countries such as Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Portugal
and Switzerland. 256 Regarding revisionism in Europe, Germany and
France use different legal terms to cover revisionist views, including
approval or justification, and contestation. 257 This includes, in the
European context, three verbs - to deny, to justify, and to minimize repeatedly used to define negationism and revisionism. 258
Memory law can be used by new democracies to declare a clearcut departure from the past, although possibly at the cost of free
expression, which they should respect and protect more. Consequent to
the recent democratization process, Cambodia has recently passed the
Law Against Non-recognition of the Crimes Committed during the
Democratic Kampuchea Period, which attracted criticism from
ARTICLE 19, a NGO defending free speech rights across the world and
taking its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The law's purpose is to punish those who do not recognize,
downplay, deny, or dispute the existence of the massive crimes in the

253. See Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Criminal Conviction for
Denial that the Atrocities Perpetrated Against the Armenian People in 1915 and Years After
Constituted Genocide was Unjustified ((E. Ct. H.R. Dec. 17, 2013), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4613832-5581451#{%22itemid
%22:[%22003-4613832-5581451%22]} (last visited Dec. 3, 2014)[hereinafter Judgment
Perincek v. Switzerland Press Release].
254. See id. at 3.
255. Revisionist perspective does not deny the Holocaust but rather aims to challenge
the conventional view of responsibility for it; Negationist perspective denies the existence of
holocaust, disregards settled historical norms, and distorts the relationship between the
Holocaust and historical reality. See Emanuela Fronza, Punishment of Negationism: The
Difficult Dialogue Between Law and Memory, 30 VT. L. Rev. 609, 613- 14 (2005); see also
Pascale Bloch, Response to Professor Fronza 's the Punishment of Negationism, 30 VT. L.
REV. 627 (2005).
256. See Fronza, supra note 256, at 614-17.
257. See id. at 618.
258. Id. at 619.
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Democratic Kampuchea period. 259
Other jurisdictions, in contrast, are more tolerant and do not punish
such expressions as Guraudy' s that, according to ECtHR, are certainly
against humanities and lead to racial defamation of Jews. In these
jurisdictions, free speech rights are more respected and better protected,
with the protection extending to extreme expressions.
The Canadian Supreme Court decided so in the famous 1992 Case
of R. v. Zundel. 260 Ernst Zundel was very determined in voicing doubts
over the Holocaust of Jews in his self-published pamphlet called Did Six
Million Really Die ?261 He was convicted for spreading false news
contrary to Section 181 of the Canadian Criminal Code. 262 Regarded as
revisionist history, the pamphlet proposed: inter alia, the amount of
Jewish victims is exaggerated and the Holocaust is a myth made by the
Jewish conspiracy. 263
After convicted twice in lengthy legal
proceedings, Zundel appealed and the Canadian Supreme Court held
that the appeal shall be admitted and Section 181 is unconstitutional. 264
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing on behalf of the Court, said that
Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects
all expression of non-violent form, and the content of Zundel's
pamphlet is irrelevant in the instant case. 265 Furthermore, "[ t]his Court
has repeatedly affirmed that all communications which convey or
attempt to convey meaning are protected by [Section] 2(b ), unless the
physical form by which the communication is made (for example, by a
violent act) excludes protection." 266
One may compare Zundel with an earlier 1990 case Keegstra. The
Canadian Supreme Court ruled differently, upholding Keegstra's
259. Cambodia: Law Against Non-Recognition of the Crimes Committed During
Democratic
Kampuchea,
AR TIC LE
19
(June
2013 ),
available
at
http://www.article 19 .org/data/files/medialibrary/3 7127/13-06-27-cambodia-LA.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 3 2014).
260. R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (Can.).
261. See id. at 743.
262. See id. at 744.
263. See id.
264. Seeid.
265. R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (Can.). Zundel was also involved in two other
cases regarding Holocaust denial and finally was denounced by the Canadian authority as a
threat to national security who denied his application for Canadian citizenship. Deported
back to Germany, he was convicted of repeated Holocaust denials and sentenced to five
years imprisonment in 2007. Associated Press, German Activist Ernst Zundel Gets 5 Years
for
Denying
Holocaust,
Fox NEWS
(Feb.
16,
2007),
available
at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/02/16/german-activist-emst-zundel-gets-5-years-fordenying-holocaust (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
266. Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 753.
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conviction of hate propaganda and dissemination. 267 In this case,
Justice McLachlin, as the dissenting judge, opined in similar lines as in
Zundel that the alleged speeches conveyed a meaning or a message of
non-violent nature. 268 Thus, it is under the protection of Section 2(b),
which protects the fundamental rights to free expression and thought. 269
It "protects all content of expression irrespective of the meaning or
message sought to be conveyed, no matter how offensive it may be."270
She reasoned that "Section 319(2) does not constitute a reasonable limit
upon free speech" and "lacks the required degree of proportionality.'' 271
In the United States, freedom of expression extends even to a much
wider scope including hate speeches and Holocaust denial. As
Persinger noted, "[ o]ne of the principles this country holds dear is the
opportunity to express and receive information regardless of how
unpopular it may be. " 272 This broadened free speech protection covers
civil public discourses, including hate speeches and speeches denying
Lasson noticed that the only
Holocaust for various reasons. 273
jurisprudential remedy against Holocaust denial was by means of
contract law. 274 The related case is about a Holocaust survivor who
won back his denied award of $50,000 for providing successful
evidence for the death of Jews at Auschwitz offered by the Institute for
Historical Review. 275
The American Constitution, said Lidsky, does not allow the State
to "punish citizens for holding anti-Semitic beliefs nor prevent them
from receiving information likely to foster such beliefs." 276 It is
strongly argued that rebuttal of such speeches should be combated in
markets of free speech and the State should be out of this terrain, since
potential censorship may follow state interference in public discourses

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 795-96 (Can.).
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 703, 706.
Jason Persinger, The Harm to Student First Amendment Rights When School

Boards Make Curricular Decisions in Response to Political Pressure: A Critique of
Griswold v. Driscoll, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 291, 312 (2012).
273. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where's the Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation
of Lies, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2008) ( arguing "unlike other countries, the
United States has never justified the regulation of verifiably false speech on the grounds of
that it poses a generalized threat of dignitary harm," such as Holocaust denial speeches).
274. See Lasson, supra note 248, at 77.
275. Id.
276. Lidsky, supra note 274, at 1095.
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that are critical to a democracy. 277
For many, the protection of free speech by the Americans probably
goes too far sometimes, in particular for those who regard such
unpopular, distorted speeches as a means to engrain critical thinking for
students and provide bad examples. When Myers sought to remove
books of Holocaust-denial nature at Texas A&M University Library,
worrying about their influences among students, he was only able to get
them removed from the category of Holocaust and Jewish History to a
different sub-category called Errors and Inventions. Even worse, he
attracted criticisms from fellow scholars across the country, arguing that
any suppression of books is wrong, no matter how repugnant their
message, since no fine line can be drawn on the issue. 278 Even his
sympathizers agreed that such books should not be removed so that they
could be used to study anti-Semitism. 279
The popular fear among the Americans of a slippery road to state
censorship of free expression bears a heavier weight than their impulse
to prevent dignitary harms, mental distress, incitement, and social
disorder consequent to such expressions. 280 The First Amendment right
of free expression has been worshiped on the sanctuary altar by many
Americans as an absolute right. 281
H. Immortality in the Information Age
The Information Age has fundamentally changed the situations of
posthumous reputation and history studies. Online defamation and
privacy invasion cases have attracted attentions of legal scholars to
debate their impact on defamation law and privacy law all over the
world. Due to the information persistence on and easy access to the
Internet, 282 on the one hand, the dead' s reputation can be kept longer
277. See id. at 1095-99 (illustrating the reasons to allow the breathing space for lies);
see also Lasson, supra note 248, at 52-64 (discussing the First Amendment consideration
regarding Holocaust denial speeches in U.S. law).
278. See Mary Ann Roser, A&M Professor Stirs Debate over Holocaust Denial Books,
H-NET
(Apr.
11,
1996,
11: 15
PM),
available
at
http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl ?trx=vx&list=hho locaust&month=9604&week=b&msg=MvFTsuPctbrs 1hgNxSzTTQ&user=&pw=
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
279. Lasson, supra note 248, at 43.
280. See id. at 68 (Lasson argued that "anything which restricts this right (freedom of
self-expression) is a step on the road toward tyranny.").
281. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245 (1961).
282. See SIMSON GARFfNKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (O'Reilly Media 2001) (discussing the threat of the Internet to personal data
protection for information persistency); see also Jean-Francois Blanchette & Deborah G.
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and become known via the Internet, and therefore becomes more
connected with history. On the other hand, the popular use of the
Internet makes defamation of the dead much easier because everyone
has the chance to speak to the whole world on social media and social
networks. While the Internet has posed a new threat to the reputations
of the deceased, it also provides a new forum for public discussion of
the past. The Internet has escalated the conflict between free expression
and protection of the dead's reputation and privacy.
Disclosure of the dead' s information, even for good purposes,
attracts complaints from surviving families. In 2003, Dutch citizen
Eiseres, as the only daughter of her Jewish parents and one of the socalled child survivors, sued in Amsterdam for the publication of
information of her dead parents and her family. The Foundation of
Digital Monument of the Jewish Community in Netherlands (Stichting
Digitaal Monument Joodse Gemeenschap) was founded in 2000 for the
purposes of keeping alive the memory of the dead victims of the Nazi
Holocaust and for promoting scientific research and use of educational
materials. 283 The plaintiff complained that the online publication of her
family's data caused her psychological damage and invaded the privacy
of the family. 284 The Amsterdam court judged in favor of the
foundation after considering the facts that the deceased victims'
information has already been disclosed online and such publication is
not in violation of their honor and reputation in reality. It ruled that the
publication is not unlawful and does not lead to abuse of right, 285 so that
in the instant case "the importance of freedom of expression shall
prevail. " 286
In some jurisdictions, the dead's online reputation has been well
secured, which leads to censorship of history from state authorities. The
Thai government, for instance, blocked the domestic access to the Yale
University Press website in 2006 when the latter planned to publish Paul
Handley's The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol
Adulyadej. 287 The book portrayed a disfavored image of the dead king
Johnson, Data Retention and the Panopticon Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness,
18 INFO. Soc'Y 33 (2002); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L.
REV . ONLINE 88 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacyparadox/right-to-be-forgotten (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
283. HR 12 november 2003, KB 2003, 1363 m.nt GJ (Eiseres/ Stichting Digitaal
Monument Joodse Gemeenschap in Nederland en Gedaagde)(Neth.)[hereinafter Eiseres].
284. Id. at 6.1.
285. Id. at7.4.
286. Id. (" ... moet het belang van de uitingsvrijheid de doorslag geven.").
287. James Warrick-Alexander, Thailand Bars Univ. Website, YALE DAILY NEWS,
available at http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2006/02/06/_-31649/ (last visited Jan 9, 2015).
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in contrast to the popular official image and encountered many
obstacles in publication and dissemination from the Thai state
authority. 288 In 2011, Joe Gordon, a Thai-born American, was punished
with two and a half years' imprisonment for his defaming the royal
family after he posted translated sections of the book online on
American territory. 289 In such jurisdictions, the Internet has become a
new battlefield to suppress criticisms of official history and national
honor, of which posthumous defamation is a handy cause of action
ready for use.

V. FREE SPEECH AND HISTORY CENSORSHIP
Many may regard the American law's strong protection of free
speech, including hate speech and revisionism or negationism, as
radical. But from another point of view, such protection draws a clean
line to prevent the potential instrumental use of defamation law and
privacy law to introduce history censorship by political power. As the
protection of posthumous dignitarian personality rights covers the
dead's reputation and privacy, we have observed the disproportional
restrictions of free expression of journalists or historians by European
domestic courts that were overruled by ECtHR. 290
In this regard, the common law's general rejection of protecting
posthumous reputation has wiped out the possibility totally, unless it has
a strong connection to the living's legally protected interest. One has to
admit that the American approach is the approach to best meet the
international standards promulgated by abovementioned international
human rights law.

A. International Standards
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
("UDHR") protects the right to free expression and the rights to seek,

288. Jane Perlez, A Banned Book Challenges Saintly Image of Thai King, N.Y. TIMES
(Sep.
25,
2006),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/world/asia/25thailand.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
289. Thai Judge Gives American Two Years' Jail for "Insulting Monarchy",
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
7,
2011),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011 /dec/08/thai-american-jail-insulting-monarchy (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
290. See generally Editions Pion v. France, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 39 (2004);
Lehideux v. France, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998); Mizzi v. Malta, Chamber Judgment Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2006).
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receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds. 291 Article 19 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")
prescribes in particular the right to freedom of expression and freedom
to access to information and ideas, and recognizes relative duties and
responsibilities carried with such rights, like to respect others'
reputation, etc. 292 Article 20 of ICCPR excludes expressions of
"propaganda of war, advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence" from its
The rights to freedom of expression under such
protection. 293
international treaties are broad enough to include and extend to "almost
everything intended to covey meaning", including "information and
ideas of all kinds", 294 even speeches regarded as "deeply offensive."295
According to these international treaties, expressions of historical
research nature shall be protected by domestic law - in the same way as
expressions of political discourse, 296 political canvassing, 297
journalism,298 cultural and artistic expression, 299 teaching, 300 religious
discourse, 301 etc. 302 In particular, General Comment No. 34 of the
Human Rights Committee pointed out that "[ a]11 forms of opinion are
protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or
religious nature. It is incompatible with paragraph 1 to criminalize the
holding of an opinion." 303 If such standards can be strictly taken into
291. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, G.A. Res 217 (III), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
292. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, G.A. Res 2200A
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/Res/2200A(XXI), (Mar. 23, 1976).
293. Id. art. 20.
294. Id. art. 19.
295. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34 on Art. 19: Freedoms of
Opinion and Expression, Sept. 12, 2011, para. 11, CCPR/C/GC/34, 102 nd Sess., (July 2011 ).
296. See generally Essono Mika Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, Communication No.
414/1990, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990 (1994).
297. Concluding Observations on Japan, Human Rights Comm., 94th Sess., Oct. 30,
2008, para. 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/JPN/C0/5, (Oct. 2008).
298. Mavlonov and Sa'di v. Uzbekistan, Human Rights Comm, 95th Sess., March 16Apr. 9, 2009, para. 8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004 (March 19, 2009).
299. Hak-Chul Shin v. Republic of Korea, Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., March
15-Apr. 2, 2004, para. 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR//C/80/D/926/2000 (2004).
300. Ross v. Canada, Human Rights Comm., May 1, 1996, para. 11.1,U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (2000).
301. Id. at 11.5.
302. See generally Cambodia: Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review,
ARTICLE
19,
(June
24,
2013),
available
at
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37121/en/cambodia:-joint-submission-tothe-un-universal-periodic-review (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (discussion of International
standards).
303. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34 on Art. 19: Freedoms of
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account by the contracting states of the ICCPR, they shall have not
criminalized Holocaust deniers and revisionists. In practice, most such
laws are justified by prevention of racial discrimination, racial
incitement, to "national security or of public order (order public), or of
public health or morals", as prescribed by Article 19. 304
The strong tune of these important international laws, of which
most western countries are signatories, has been much softened in legal
realities even in European democracies. As discussed in the above
Section IV (G), European democracies such as France, Spain, Germany
and Belgium have adopted memory laws regarding Nazi Holocausts,
atrocities and other crimes against humanity. Furthermore, recently the
new democracies in Eastern Europe have passed laws condemning the
past sins of the communists, including the Ukrainian Famine. 305 Even
the European Union proposed a legislative framework for Member
States that certain forms of conducts committed for a racist or
xenophobic purpose such as, among others, "'publicly condoning,
denying or grossly trivializing crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes' should be punished with between one and
three years' imprisonment. " 306
This attitude can be witnessed in ECtHR judgments. For example,
in Garaudy, the Court unanimously ruled that speech in justification of
a pro-Nazi policy could not be protected under Article 10, since it
belongs to the clearly established historical facts and is "against the
Convention's underlying values." 307 But similar laws are not without
criticisms. 308 Even in France, which has taken to more memory laws
than others with respect to Holocaust denial, Armenian genocide, slave
trade and French colonialism, the French Constitutional Council
announced the Armenian Genocide Law to be unconstitutional in a
Opinion and Expression, Sept. 12, 2011, para. 9, CCPR/C/GC/34, 102nd Sess., (July 2011)
(emphasis added by author).
304. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 293, art. 19
305. Josie Appleton, Freedom for History? The Case Against Memory Laws, FREE
SPEECH
DEBATE
(April
3,
2013),
available
at
http://freespeechdebate.com/en/discuss/freedom-for-history-the-case-against-memory-laws/
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
306. Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA,
2008
O.J.
(L328/55)
Art.
l(l)(c),
Art.
3(2),
available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32008F0913 :EN :NOT (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
307. Garaudy V. France, HUMAN RJGHTS AND PUB. LAW UPDATE, available at
http://www.lcor.com/1315/?form_l 155.replyids=875 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
308. See Gerald Tishler, When Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech Confront
Holocaust Denial and Group Libel: Comparative Perspectives, 8 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 65
(1988).
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2012 decision. 309 The protection of free speech regarding the Armenian
genocide has been supported most recently in a ECtHR judgment on
December 17th, 2013 which overruled his criminal conviction under
Swiss Criminal Code for "racialist discrimination." 310

B. Historical Truth or Judicial Truth
While expressions regarding clearly established historical facts
lead to controversies, it is easy for courts of law to make decisions,
since there is no need to decide the truth of alleged expressions such as
Holocaust denial and past atrocities. The court's role is to analyze the
desired aims, the deployed methods and the content of the expression,
and then decide whether or not such expression denies clearly
established historical facts. 311 Whether memory laws are really a threat
to free speech rights of the public, in particular historians, deserves
more analysis when they restrict dissents of clearly established facts.
Still, it is important to consider the common law approach that a clearcut line is the best to protect free speech and to prevent state
interference of free expression in posthumous defamation cases from
sneaking into history censorship.
However, when controversies involve historical facts that are not
clearly established, adjudicating courts will face difficulties, first in
checking if such alleged expressions are true, and second, in balancing
free speech rights with posthumous reputation protection.
Most courts will refuse to engage themselves in investigating
historical facts or truth, because courts are neither composed for such
purposes nor suitable for such tasks, 312 when truth is an absolute defense
in many jurisdictions. 313 The argument from historians that historical
309. Nicholas Vinocur & Jon Hemming, French Court Rules Armenian Genocide Law
at
available
2012),
28,
(Feb,
POST
NAT'L
Unconstitutional,
http ://news.nationalpost.corn/2012/02/28/french-court-rules-armenian-genocide-lawunconstitutional/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
310. Judgment Perincek v. Switzerland Press Release, supra note 254.
311. Garaudy v. France, App. No.65831/01, para. 2 (E. Ct. R.R. June 24, 2003),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-23829 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014) (highlighting the French government's replies to the ECtHR).
312. The ECtHR in Chauvy explicated "it is an integral part of freedom of expression
to seek historical truth and it is not the Court's role to arbitrate the underlying historical
issues, which are part of a continuing debate between historians that shapes opinion as to the
events which took place and their interpretation." Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01,
at
available
2004),
29,
Sept.
H.R.
Ct.
(Eur.
69
para.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
313. An exception, for example, is Israeli Defamation Act that does not recognize
truthfulness as a defense except a case is of public concern, though in practice "the courts
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truth should be settled among historians themselves instead of in court
is popularly supported and catches the nerves of judges. 314 Due to the
vagueness of truth in historical study, judges are uncomfortable with
truth defenses and will try to avoid questing controversial content at
stake. 315 And if they cannot consider the truth-value of facts and
opinions, 316 judges can only rely on the facts and opinions brought up
by parties whose reliability is within their expertise. 317 Judges will
decide on other standards that qualify such speeches to be under
protection, such as qualified professional methods, fair comment, public
interest, balanced opinions, prudence, and good faith. 318
But some judges do go that far to verify the truthfulness of
defamation. In the above-discussed Italian case in 1970s, the Italian
court conducted a two-year-long investigation in order to find what had
happened, so that the dead Vatican Pop Pius XII was proved innocent of
Katz's allegation of moral defects in being a bystander to the Ardeatine
Quarries Massacre in Rome. 319 If courts involve themselves in such
activities, then "the feasibility and desirability of authoritative judicial
resolutions in matters of truth and falsity" is continuously under
doubt. 320 The Israeli Supreme Court, in Sharon v. Benziman, ruled that
given other grounds to decide the case exists; judges shall avoid
determining historical truth. 321 The fallout of court-decided historical
truth is that any potential mistakes in the future can impair the judiciary
authority before the public. However, the Israeli courts have performed
such a role in seeking historical truth in past decisions. According to
Barak-Erez, the courts' recounts of the past have served as the official
history of the Israeli state and its official institutions within which the
state organs operate including the judiciary. 322
If misjudgments were made, they have to be followed in later cases
and this puts courts in a passive position when new evidence or new
facts may emerge regarding the same historical controversy. The
judiciary' s independence, very much dependent on the separation of its
seem to find public concern in the bulk of true publications". But cf Peled, The Israeli Law
of Defamation: A Comparative Perspective and a Sociological Analysis, 20 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 735, 757 (2012).
314. See DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 86.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See id. at 87.
319. Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 877.
320. Peled, supra note 79, at 756.
321. Id. at 757.
322. Barak-Erez, supra note 29, at 100-01.
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authority over legal issues from political power, will be diminished.
Resta and Zeno-Zencovich observed this in their research concerning
the dilemma between historical truth and judicial truth confronted by
Italian courts. 323 As in the Katz case, when new evidence was released
by the CIA and the Vatican Archives, new doubts raised, which proved
that courts may not be the appropriate place to settle historical
disputes. 324 The two authors in particular noted that when facts and past
behaviors were evaluated in a court trial, the judgment made a judicial
version of history and it entered the judicial circuit, influencing sequent
decisions in a circular and self-referential way. 325 As the authors
observed in Italian cases regarding historical controversies, judicial
truth "starts to work as an external limit on the freedom of the media to
report about an historical event. " 326
C. The Icons ofHistory Censorship
Because it is an integral part of freedom of expression to seek
historical truth, 327 a total ban on contesting speeches against official or
popular history- including those with well-established historical facts may lead to censorship of history, even in case of the Holocaust and
atrocities. While totalitarian states use censorship to gain legitimacy by
forbidding open debate over historical lies, democracies should be
confident in open discourses of dark past in order to protect free speech
in abstract sense, avoiding any slippery move toward state interference,
and protecting the breathing space even for lies. 328 Constitutional courts
should have a more active role to play in striking down such laws, as the
French Constitutional Council's recent move in quashing the French
government's peppy intervention of history, though somehow at the
price of mental distress to Armenian people. History is not the stuff of
justice, as Wartanian warned, "it belongs to historians who rectify lies,
not to politicians. " 329 As courts cannot decide on the truthfulness of the
323. Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 880-86.
324. Id at878- 79.
325. Id at 874- 78. In multiple related cases regarding the Ardeatine Quarries
Massacre in Rome, Italian courts offered different evaluations of historical facts. Id
326. Id at 874.
327. Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01, para. 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 29, 2004),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
328. Lidsky, supra note 274, at 1095.
329. See Raffi Wartanian, Memory Laws in France and their Implications:
HUMANITY
IN
ACTION,
available
at
Institutionalizing
Social
Harmony,
http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/l 17-memory-laws-in-france-and-theirimplications-institutionalizing-social-harmony (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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presented evidence by different parties, they have to ask for testimony
from historians as expert witness. 330
Courts should act more carefully in defamatory cases that involve
historical facts that are not so clearly established but are of public
interest. Courts shall leave historical facts for open discussions by
others including historians. In such cases, courts also need to balance
the dead's dignity, including their privacy and reputation - as well as
their family's interests, both dignitary and commercial - with free
speech rights of others. Since interference of free speech may be
justified by protecting posthumous reputation, which is a legitimate goal
in many laws, the focus of courts should be on seeking good balance,
not investigation of truthfulness of the alleged expressions. But how
can we judge the existence of potential chilling effects in court's
balancing process or, more generally, in a judicial system? What are
the possible criteria to define possible history censorship in court
verdicts?
Above all, in my view we may look at how many categories of
defense are available to defendants in defamation cases. The more
defenses are allowed, and the higher the threshold of restriction of free
expression, the less opportunity for censorship of history in court
decisions.
As the oldest defense for defamation, truth defense has not been
allowed as complete defense in some criminal charges. 331 When truth
does not matter in defamation convictions, the purpose of the law is to
protect the political authority or social ordering. 332 In criminal
procedures, a combination of presumption of innocence and truth
defense will obviously offer the charged a strong protection against
defamation accusations. In Colombani & Others v. France, the ECtHR
330. There are critics against historians' role in court testimony. See Richard J. Evans,
History, Memory, and the Law: The Historian as Expert Witness, 41 HIST. & THEORY 326
(2002) (commenting on Henry Rousso's book, the author argued that historians shall only
elucidate the historical context and avoid being involved in judging whether an individual
was guilty or otherwise of a crime).
331. See Elaine Pearson, Criminal Defamation Laws in Indonesia Stifle Democracy,
HUM. RTS. WATCH, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/10/criminal-defamationlaws-indonesia-stifle-democracy (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (discussing the fact that in
Indonesian law, truth is not a defense if an official found your expression to be insulting);
Friedman, supra note 66, at 54 (noting that the truth only became an absolute defense in
more democratic time; and authoritarian governments do not like criticism since truth hurts,
so that in many ways the situation would be even worse if such charges were true, as said in
the old maxim).
332. Elizabeth Samson, The Freedom to Speak Truth to Power, GUARDIAN, available
at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2012/apr/20/1 ibel-law-tourismreform (last visited Dec. 3 2014).
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regarded the rejection of the French judiciary of the applicant's use of
truth defense as "beyond what is required to protect a person's
reputation and right, even if that person was a head of a state or
government. " 333
Another important defense widely adopted in most Westem
democracies is the public figure rule in particular in the U.S., which
offers more protection over speeches regarding public figures. 334 The
Chinese defamation law has not recognized such a doctrine though
some judges have mentioned it in the latest verdicts. 335 This means that
Chinese public figures, especially political figures, will enjoy equal
protection of law with average people, while holding higher social
status offers them more influence on public affairs. In Europe, the
public figure doctrine (or rule) has gained more support at least in some
ECtHR decisions. As in recent Joe Luis, the Court ruled that the limits
of acceptable criticism in view of the press "are accordingly wider with
regard to a politician acting in his public capacity than in relating to a
private individual"; and politicians "must display a greater degree of
tolerance. " 336 Again, in Lehideux & lsorni v. France, the Commission
emphasized the importance of historical debate about a public figure
and the related different opinions. 337 In Suarez v. Spain, it stated that
"[ e]xceptions to freedom of expression must be interpreted
333. Colombani & Others v. France, App No 51279/99, para. 66 (E. Ct. H.R. Sept. 25,
2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-60532 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
334. For an explanation of the public figure doctrine in U.S. law; see Scott
Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public
Figures, 49 AM. Bus. L.J. 125-208 (2012); George E. Stevens, Local and Topical Pervasive
Public Figures After Gertz., 66 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 463 (1989); Catherine Hancock,
Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First Amendment Defamation Law, N.Y. INT'L L.
REY. 81 (2006); James C. Mitchell, The Accidental Purist: Reclaiming the Gertz: All
Purpose Public Figure Doctrine in the Age of "Celebrity Journalism", 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 559 (2002); John J. Watkins, The Demise of the Public Figure Doctrine, J. COMMC'N:
A PUBL'N NAT'L Soc'y FOR STUDY COMMC'N 47 (1977).
335. Hou Shoujin yu Zhongguodianying Jituan Gongshi Deng Qinhaimingyuquan An
I]!
Huo Shoujin v. China Film Group et al.]
available
at
(Beijing
High
Ct.
2007)
(China)
http://www.fsou.com/html/text/fnl/1176753/l l 7675388.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
336. Gutierrez Suarez, App. No. 16023/07, para. 26 (2010); Case of Jerusalem v.
Austria, App. No. 26958/95, para. 38 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 27, 2001), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-59220 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
337. Lehideux, App. No. 24662/94, para. 45; see Von Hannover v. Germany (No.2),
App. Nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, para. 64, 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-109029 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014) (explaining wider protection of privacy for public figures' awarded even when no
public interest is involved in publication).
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restrictively." 338 In the 2013 Eon v. France, it emphasised on the wider
range of criticism of politicians than ordinary people, since they
willingly subject themselves to public and media scrutiny. 339
In addition, the Assembly Resolution of the Council of Europe on
the Right to Privacy prescribes that the right to privacy of public figures
is lucrative and often invaded, but they must recognize that the social
position they occupy in society automatically entails increased pressure
on their privacy. 340 Also, most recently, the Council of Europe adopted
a rule similar to public figure doctrine to restrict the extra-protection of
public figures in their privacy (family life) and reputation. 341
The admission of opinions and fair comment for defense are
important for free speech protection. After Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co., 342 the U.S. defamation law has moved away from the long doctrine
since Sullivan, 343 and a defense similar to opinion privilege has been
adopted by the ECtHR when opinions or fair comments are "on a matter
of public interest which was underpinned by a sufficient factual
basis. " 344
In addition, courts should allow historians and journalists the
defenses of professional standards, sufficient prudence, good faith, and
participation in academic debates. 345 Once courts are willing to accept
338. Gutierrez Suarez, App. No. 16023/07, para. 26. Also, note a series of recent
cases judged by ECtHR regarding the analysis of term of public figures in its verdicts. See
also Verlagsgruppe News GmbH & Bobi v. Austria, App. No. 59631/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr.
3, 2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-115013
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014); 000 'Vesti' & Ukhov v. Russia, App. No. 21724/03 (Eur. Ct.
H.R.
Aug.
30,
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=OO 1-119969 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
339. ECtHR: Eon v France, ARTICLE 19 (Aug. 1, 2013), available at
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37188/en/ecthr:-eon-v-france (last visited
Dec. 3 2014).
340. EUR. PARL. Ass., Res. 1165 - Right to privacy, 24th Sess., at para. 6 (1998),
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta98/eres 1165 .htm
(last
visited Nov. 17, 2014).
341. EUR. PARL. Ass., Res. 15 77 - Towards decriminalization of defamation , 34th
Sess.,
at
para.
6,
17.6
(2007),
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta07/eres 1577 .htm
(last
visited Nov. 17, 2014) (describing resolutions regarding defamation and privacy laws).
342. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (ruling the First
Amendment does not require a separate "opinion" privilege limiting the application of state
defamation laws).
343. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
344. Jucha & Zak v. Poland, App. No. 19127/06, para. 45 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 23,
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-113919 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
345. See DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 87.
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such defenses, even if the alleged narratives or accounts of historical
events bear some falsity, judges in general will rule in favor of free
speech. For instance, French historian Jean-Luc Einaudi was found
guilty, but with no remedy awarded because his research is of a
"serious, relevant and comprehensive" nature according to the court. 346
In contrast, rejection of justifiable defenses in courts is a clear sign
of potential censorship in posthumous defamation cases. As De Baets
pointed out in his study, historians were found as defamers on the
following grounds: "they did not interview eyewitnesses, overestimated
the value of certain texts or acts of the complainant, did not consult
original sources but literature only, or attached [more] importance to a
De Baets' observations of the posthumous
single source. " 347
defamation cases find a parallel pattern in Chinese cases. In many
cases, Chinese judges upheld defamation petitions because the authors
did not use authoritative sources, 348 did not verify the sources used with
the deceased's family before publication, 349 did not verify the sources
such as oral history and published individual memoirs, 350 or did not
work with due care in some cases, 351 etc. Also, there was no distinction
between opinions and facts in historians' alleged texts made by Chinese
courts. 352 It proved that the more defenses that are accepted by courts,
the more that professional methods are respected, and the less that
censorship will occur in court decisions.
Secondly, courts may restrict free expression on obviously weird
grounds in some cases, when procedural requirements prevent other
ways of protecting the deceased's reputation. In Mizzi v. Malta, the
controversial text that was accused of being defamatory was a simple
sentence "Dr. Boffa wanted to build there," which was read by the
deceased's son as "attribut[ing] false and despicable intentions to his
father," 353 and by the Maltase Court of Appeals as "it implied that Dr.
346. Ariane Chemin, Long History of a Forgotten Massacre, LE POINT INT'L (Nov. 5,
2011 ), available at http://www.lepointintemational.com/it/cultura/europa/765-long-historyof-a-forgotten-massacre.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). Due to the brave historians' works
on the subject, the killings of Algerians in France in 1961 were recognized by the French
government and a plaque was put on the bridge where the event happened to commemorate
the dead. Id.
347. DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 87.
348. See Bo Zhao, Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy in China: The
Dead, the Law, and the Social Transition, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 269, 323 (2014).
349. See id. at 347.
350. See id. at 341.
351. See id. at 347.
352. See id. at 347-48.
353. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec.

Published by SURFACE, 2014

63

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 4

102

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 42:1

Boffa had taken advantage of his position as head of the civil
administration," a reading supported by the Constitutional Court. 354 It
was denied by the ECtHR since such a reading "made it very difficult, if
not impossible, for the applicant to provide direct corroboration of it." 355
In the Spanish Gutierrez Suarez, the Spanish Supreme Court, was
unable to declare defamation on solid grounds, pointed to the headline
of the alleged article instead of body content, as violating the honor of
the then deceased Moroccan King. 356 The ECtHR rejected this decision
that headlines, whose aim is to call the attention of readers, must be read
in combination with body context; and that "journalistic freedom also
covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even
provocation. " 357 Both interpretations of such texts were strange even to
ordinary readers.
Lastly, censorship of free speech in posthumous defamation cases
may generally be found in the disproportionality of court verdicts. This
is seen either in improper protections given to posthumous reputation or
privacy, while obviously it is not in great danger; or in the legal
measures restricting free speech, such as injunctions, and remedies and
damages awarded to plaintiffs, which are unusual, exceeding necessity.
While posthumous reputation is recognized as legitimate, it is a
delicate issue for courts to balance the deceased' s interests and their
families' with the free speech of others, in particular when public
interest is involved. As a fundamental value to democracy, free speech
rights shall have certain priority, unless exceptional occasions are at
stake.
Take Szenes for example, where Justice Cheshin even claimed the
equal legal status of reputation to free speech in democracy and the
Jewish community in particular, including reputation of the dead. 358 It
defined that among others, the realization of collective identity of the
state, its national history, and its own social goals form part of public
interest. 359 The Israeli Supreme Court pointed out that the petition was
filed under the public law to protect public interest, such as protecting
the dignity and good name of the dead, protecting historical truth and
3, 2014).
354. Id. para. 12, 15.
355. Id. para. 35.
356. The Constitutional Court of Spain upheld the decision. Gutierrez Suarez, App.
No. 16023/07, para. 10 ("It stated that the headlines of the information led the average
reader to believe that the Moroccan royal family had been an accomplice to illegal
trafficking in hashish.").
357. Id. para. 36.
358. Szenes, 53(3) PD 817 at para. 9, 12.
359. Id. para. 17.
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honoring national values, as well as the rights of defendants. The court
judged that regarding the circumstances that can justify curtailing
freedom of expression, expressions that are offensive to other's feelings
are not a strong ground, because "if every such offense was to justify
infringement, surely these freedoms and indeed democracy itself would
be emptied of meaning. " 360
The court admitted that a democracy should be sensitive to such
feelings, but "[a] democratic society is based on the recognition that the
feelings of some will inevitably be offended by their fellows' exercise
of their respective freedoms." 361 The court stated explicitly that in
explaining the protection of heroes and collective memory, law in a
democracy does not preserve the image of its heroes by repressing
freedom of expression, and that truth shall reject falsehood in the free
market of ideas. 362 In conclusion, the court rejected protection of the
dead's name under public law, but ruled that the requested remedy
could only be sought in private law, where the balance could be made
differently. 363
In the above reasoning, we observe a clear but high threshold of "a
compelling or urgent need" to justify the restriction of free speech. 364
This can be regarded as a standard to gauge potential censorship in
relevant court decisions. At this point, the ECtHR carries out its
balancing processes in a similar way when facing appeals from largelydiversified social-cultural backgrounds, by interpreting the adjective
"necessary" in Article 10 (2) as implying the existence of a pressing
social need. " 365 On the whole, the Court balanced different interests in
a much-fixed pattern, in particular when it takes into account the margin
of appreciation of Contracting States, so that it will not interfere with
domestic affairs. 366 The Court usually checks if state interference with
free speech has a legitimate aim prescribed by law, if such restriction is
necessary to a democracy, and if it is in accordance with the
360. Id. para. 20.
361. Id. para. 22.
362. Id. para. 27-28.
363. Szenes, 53(3) PD 817 at para. 28.
364. In Justice Mazza's words, "a concrete and imminent danger of uprooting the
public order." Id. para. 28. (quoting HCJ 2888/97 Novik v. Channel Two Television &
Radio PD 51(5)193, 202 (Isr.)).
365. See Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 29, 2004),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014); see Editions Plon v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18,
2004), available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-61760 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
366. See Chauvy, App. No. 64915/01; see Editions Pion, App. No. 58148/00.
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proportionality standard, not exceeding necessity. 367
In Chauvy, the Court noted that it must consider the public interest
in being informed of the circumstances of the previous French
Resistance leader, and the need to protect the reputation of Mr. and Mrs.
Aubrac in the impugned betrayal of the book. 368 Furthermore, the Court
prescribed that it "must verify whether the state authorities struck a fair
balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention",
namely the right of expression and the right of others to reputation. 369
As pointed out already, the Court did not judge the legitimacy in
protecting posthumous reputation or honor by contracting states, since
this is a matter within margin of apperception. 370 It merely executed its
supervisory role to verify the proper use of legal measures in limiting
free speech, and the proportionality of the interference contingent on the
nature and severity of the penalties imposed. 371
In Pion, the Court pointed out the circumstance of time distance as
an important element in striking a good balance. 372 The Court found the
book ban in violation of Article 10 in that the more time elapsed after
the President's death, the more the public interest in debating the
President's two terms of presidency prevailed over his interest to
medical confidentiality, in particular when the duty of confidentiality
was breached and there was already dissemination in traditional media
and the Intemet. 373 Another important ruling from the ECtHR is that
posthumous reputation is a much weaker interest in balancing different
values under its protection. 374
The discussion of the proportionality standard brings us to
available measures used by courts to restrict free speech in posthumous
defamation cases. Usually this could be monetary damages awarded to
plaintiffs or defamation victims, and injunctions (prohibitory or
367. See Chauvy, App. No. 64915/01; see Editions Pion, App. No. 58148/00.
368. Chauvy, App. No. 64915/01, para. 69.
369. Id. para. 70.
370. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012), available at
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
371. Chauvy, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 78 ("Assessing the proportionality of the
interference, the nature and severity of the penalties imposed.").
372. See Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18, 2004),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-61760 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014).
373. Id. para. 53.
374. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014) (ruling that "in this respect, although the possibility of bringing such an action
existed in the Maltese legal system .. . it is of the view that this element should have been
considered by the domestic courts when assessing the proportionality of the interference.").
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mandatory). Since defamation of the dead should generally cause less
harm than defamation of the living, damages awarded accordingly
should be comparatively lower. As seen in Mizzi v. Malta, the awarded
damages were a symbolic amount of 700 euros. 375 Interim injunctions
are more acceptable for prevention of potential harm when the real
circumstances are unclear. 376 If a book has a small defamatory part
about a deceased historical figure and can be corrected by deletion or
change of text, banning the whole book after publication is obviously an
indication of potential censorship by state. 377
In many occasions, an obligatory publication of apology or court
verdict will be ordered to restore the deceased's reputation. Though this
might be an insult to authors, its real impact is doubtful in social reality.
Bans and publication of apologies on widely circulated media or on the
Internet could bring even more public attention because of the famous
Streisand effect. 378 In the history of censorship, many times banning
books did not stop circulations; instead the bans even brought more
readers to banned authors.
D. A Threat from Law or to Law?

A last point to make is that whether a law implements history
censorship - or censorship of expressions regarding the past of the dead
- has to be defined more carefully, not denoted in a few cases regarding
posthumous defamation and privacy-invasion. It has to be found in a
series of similar cases in which judges have constantly restricted free
speech rights with respect to historical expressions, by upholding
defamation convictions, awarding large damages, and imposing
unnecessary injunctions. It has to be demonstrated that the pursued
legal aims are not just and prescribed by law. It has to be demonstrated
that free expression has been given less weight than they should have
been, if following the proportionality standard endorsed by the
ECtHR. 379 However, if a jurisdiction always decides in favor of
375. See id. para. 39. Also, an award of eighty-eight Euros in damages is more or less
symbolic in the famous Flux v. Moldova. See also Flux v. Moldova (No. 6) App. No.
22824/04
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
Oct.
29,
2008),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-88063 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
376. For instance, European Court of Human Rights accepted interim injunctions in
general. Editions Pion, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 35, 48.
377. As pointed out by the ECtHR in Pion. See id.
378. See Mario Cacciottolo, The Streisand Effect: When Censorship Backfires, BBC
(last updated June 15, 2012, 11 :19 PM), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk18458567 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
379. See discussion supra Section V(C).
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posthumous defamation regarding deceased political figures with
impact in history, while it awards no such protection to the ordinary
deceased, we may observe possible censorship of history conducted in a
legal system.
While historians and free speech rights advocators criticize
censorship of history via legal protection of the dead's reputation and
privacy, proponents of posthumous dignitary rights may argue that the
presumed chilling effects are not only imaginary, but also practically
not true. For example, for Hannes Rosier, the idea that a posthumous
personality right could deter valuable historical research is not well
justified. 38 First of all, Rosler argued, since truth is the commonly
acceptable defense of libel charges, it will motivate historians to publish
more accurate, factually-based statements. 381 A second reason, he
argued, is that adoption of the narrow dignitary personality right could
encourage free speech instead of chilling it. 382 If one knows that his
lifetime achievement and reputation in the public memory can be
protected, he would participate more actively in public discourse and
disclose more personal information. 383 A third reason is that due to the
failure of the marketplace of ideas, there is public interest to protect
reputation against defamatory statements, in particular those against the
deceased and defenseless minorities. 384 Other arguments include the
lack of societal interest in false communication, potential exceptional
protection only for severely infringements, and proportional restriction
via balanced decisions. 385
Rosler's arguments cannot be denied in abstract. In reality,
however, counter examples can be found in some ECtHR cases
regarding posthumous defamation and privacy invasion. For many
contracting states, protection of the dead's dignity and personality
nevertheless ended up in decisions that were overturned by the Court for
free speech protection. 386 The threat from the deceased's families with
a defamation suit, whether criminal or civil, causes authors to selfcensor before publication. The legal recognition of posthumous dignity

°

380. Rosler, supra note 77, at 190.
381. Id. at 190.
382. Id. at 188.
383. Id. at 188-89.
384. Id. at 189.
385. Rosier, supra note 77, at 188-91.
386. See Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18, 2004),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014); Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012), available at
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107 530 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014 );
Gutierrez Suarez v. Spain, App. No. 16023/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012).
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(including reputation, privacy, honor, etc.) per se provides a legal
avenue to incorporate potential state censorship. This lies in the use of
law to police the bounds of certain speeches, in particular speeches
regarding Holocaust denial, which shall draw our caution. When state
authority can regard all Holocaust or genocide denial or similar
speeches illegal, it may exclude other speeches from protection of free
speech as well, if not monitored closely by the public. Thus "a
government that can tell us what not to say can also tell us what we
must say", 387 which is detrimental to democracy holding free speech as
the most fundamental value. In a more general sense, the law's
protection of the dead' s dignitary interests and the related interest of the
living may cause a threat or chilling effect on free speech for
democracy.
With respect to law's instrumental use within this context, the
threat is not only from law, but to law itself. According to Douglas,
"certain features that define law as a formal discourse" concerning
harm, culpability, proof and jurisdiction, have "distort[ed] ... the very
history record that law has been asked to [protect]. " 388 Even worse is
that when law serves the end to protect certain kinds of information and
suppress others, especially when involving historical facts that are too
long to be investigated, law reaches its limit, as seen in the
controversies around truth commissions in many post-war countries.
With impossible missions, the real threat is to law itself, not only to
historical research. Law cannot risk its independence, authority, and
trust from the public to impose threat on free expression that is crucial
to a democracy.

VI. LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE
Law is vulnerable before politics. The Russian authority's passive
attitude to the rehabilitation of Katyn tragedy victims showcases that a
political state can have difficulties confronting its dark past. 389 The
unexpected termination of the official investigation of the tragedy in the
1990s especially reveals the law's weakness in handling sensitive,
political events. When history has a significant role to play in politics,
387. Smith, supra note 101, at 137.
388. Lawrence R. Douglas, Policing the Past: Holocaust Denial and the Law, in
CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION 67, 68 (Robert C. Post
ed., 1998).
389. See 000 'Vesti' & Ukhov v. Russia, App. No. 21724/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 30,
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-119969 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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censorship of history becomes feasible and law might be a victim of
political suppression of those who talk frankly about the past. Law is
also a product of a particular culture. While in Germany and other
continental law countries the dead's dignity and honor is significant and
protected as fundamental values by law, common law countries offer
almost no protection of such posthumous interests. This section tries to
interpret, following the above case analysis, the political and cultural
rationales underpinning potential history censorship within different
conceptual and cultural embeddings.

A. Politics and Law
Authoritarian regimes and dictatorial states have the most and
strongest motives to censor history. The primary reason is to gain
legitimacy and support of the public by use (misuse or abuse) of history
of which censorship and control of the past is a necessity. Dictators
know well the power of history and lie to distort the reputation of many
deceased opponents. For example, Stalin removed Leon Trotsky out of
books to dehumanize him because the true record of Trotsky denied
Stalin as the true heir of Lenin, showing no crucial role in the
Bolsheviks' victory. 390 The extreme use of history for legitimacy is the
distortion of the North Korean War by North Korean dictators who
described the West as the invader, diminished external military aids,
and advocated "a total victory" on its own. 391 The past is usually cast as
miserable and dark by a new political regime, so that a new community
can be promoted and cherished for development and achievement.
Second, the deceased can be forged either as a moral model for
others to follow, or as negative examples punished for political
purposes. But, such distortion or fabrication of posthumous reputation
can cause serious distrust of the regime in eventual disclosure of facts.
The famous Chinese moral model Lei Feng set up by communist
propaganda recently has been under serious scrutiny by a new
generation of historians. 392 In contrast, many landlords who are

390. MACMILLAN, supra note 4, at 25.
391. A similar story happens to USSR's support in North Korean's version of the War.
Sarah Buckley, North Korea's 'Creative' History, BBC NEWS ONLINE (July 25, 2003, 14:30
GMT), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3096265.stm (last visited Dec. 3,
2014); Korean Independence: A History Re-Written by North Korea, NEW Focus INT'L
(Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://newfocusintl.com/independence-day-in-north-koreachanging-with-the-times/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
392. The defamer of the dead hero was detained by Beijing police recently in China's
new wave to crackdown online social media which threats official authority in various
fields. Questioning of Lei Feng's Frugality Leads to Detention, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21,
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regarded as notorious and blood-sucking and who died during China's
numerous political movements, have been later found out to be merely
fabrications for political ends by the Chinese Communist Party. 393
Even dictators themselves who have been worshipped by the
populace are products of such powerful propaganda machines. Secrets
and sins deliberately covered from being known would shock the public
later. Mao's real characteristics nowadays gradually emerge before the
public because of the disclosure of his brutal political decisions and
policies from two sources: the declassification of some archives of
former the Soviet Union regarding China, 394 and the recently published
stories of Mao's private life by the individuals who worked for or
around him. 395
When public figures' reputations are so closely affiliated with the
official history of a state, to protect their reputations is to protect the
official history. Turkey's special law directly protects the honor and
dignity of the dead Ataturk. 396 The Egyptian penal code criminalized
and allowed detention for insulting the president before the Arab
Spring. 397 In these countries, law has been openly used for suppression
of speeches concerning the late public figures as direct censorship of
history per se.
"As social norms change, laws that touch on reputation and privacy
change along with them." 398 The shift in Stalin's reputation in Russia
after his death reflects the influences of political change on social
morals and ethos in Russian community. With the fall of communism
in particular, the Russian authority to some extent allowed the

2013 , 8:00 PM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/08/21/four-detainedfor-questioning-lei-fengs-frugality/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
393. For example, Liu Wencai was a fabricated figure of the communist propaganda
machine, which is totally against his real personality, to incite political hatred between
classes during the Culture Revolution. Gao Wenqian & Regina Hackett, Revisiting the
Past: Insights from the Art of the Cultural Revolution, HUMAN RTS. IN CHINA (Oct. 21,
2009), available at http://www.hrichina.org/content/3824 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
394. See ALEXANDER v. PANTSOV & STEVEN I. LEVfNE, MAO: THE REAL STORY (Simon
& Schuster reprint ed. 2013).
395. Mao's personal doctor, for instance, wrote a book portraying a different private
life from the official version, which can lower the great leader's honor. See LI ZHI-SUI, THE
PRIVATE LIFE OF CHAIRMAN MAO (Random House 1996).
396. Law Concerning Crimes Committed against Ataturk No. 5816, U.S. FOUNDATION,
INC (2014), available at http://www.usefoundation.org/view/878 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014);
see MELZER, supra note 56, at 40.
397. MELZER, supra note 56, at 188.
398. FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 5.
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discussion of Stalin's cruel ruling by historians and witnesses. 399
Attitudes to Stalin are polarized between supporters and dissents, and
between the Russian state authority and many EU countries that often
compare him with Hitler. Recently top Russian leaders reclassified the
related archives and portrayed him as an effective crisis manager. 400
The earlier popular, liberal trend among Russian politicians after the
collapse of communism seems to have been replaced with a strong
sentiment of national pride and honor. This may somehow explain the
Russian authority's reluctance to rehabilitate the deceased Polish
victims of the Katyn tragedy, although Russia itself has a rehabilitation
law to restore the reputations of those who died under communist
repression.
However, there is no turning back in Eastern European countries
that have joined the EU and willingly embraced Western political
ideology after the collapse of communism. Many countries in Eastern
Europe passed rehabilitation laws, investigated previous politically
charged suppressions, and convicted political criminals. Posthumous
reputations that were tarnished under previous communist regimes got
the chance to be restored and remedied. For instance, relatives of the
deceased Latvian peasants, who died in hands of paramilitary
combatants led by communist partisans and supported by the Russian
during the WWII, accused the surviving partisan of war crimes for
killing innocent civilians. 401 Similar cases emerged especially after the
collapse of the Berlin Wall, involving re-evaluation of communist
resistant activities during WWII against Nazi occupation. In France, the
Chauvy case involves the defamation of surviving communist resistant
forces with suspicion of their potential betrayal. 402 In Italy, public
debate on the values of the communist resistance was dramatically
reopened and the sudden increase in civil actions concerning violations
of personality rights was an immediate byproduct of the changed
political climate and of a new phase of public confrontation with the

399. Anne Garrels, Libel Case Sparks New Focus on Stalin's Reputation, NPR (Sept.
8,
2009,
3:18
PM),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=l 12642329 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
400. Id.
401. See Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 17, 2010),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-98669 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
402. See Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 29, 2004),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
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past. 403
Political change can cause re-evaluation of the past and reputations
of the deceased in new democracies such as Spain, Peru, Chile,
Argentina, etc. These countries went through political transition from
dictatorship or totalitarian states to democracy. In these countries, it is
possible to investigate political leaders' past sins and hidden secrets of
militaries in previous oppression. Therefore, many people's reputations
including the deceased could be altered in the context of political
transition. Posthumous reputation can be protected by laws strongly
supported by politicians who survived collapsed regimes or by their
families and supporters who still stay in power. Further complicating
the situation, amnesty laws may block the way to seek historical truth.
To prevent opening old historical wounds, which may detain the
restoration of democracy, the Spanish community reached compromise
and passed the 1977 Amnesty Law after Franco's death. 404 Though the
treatment of the legacy of Franco's long dictatorship is still
controversial, defamation of Franco cannot yet be tolerated by the
deceased' s proponents. 405
In a sense, we may take Spanish Amnesty Law as a form of forced
silencing or censorship of history. The 1977 Law is incompatible with
international human rights law that overrides the imprescriptibility
principle in criminal law. In addition, the Spanish Law to Historical
Memory also brings the legal principles of irretroactivity and
predictability into question. Both principles are critical to establishment
of rule of law in new democracies. 406 If such fundamental legal
doctrines or principles can be ignored, even for higher values like
justice and human dignity, the authority of law and its independence
from political power would be under threat of political whims and
sensations, which escalate easily during political change.
More importantly, Spain's Amnesty Law is the pact of different
social forces that compromised their interests to have a better future.
The law is of the nature of a social contract that should bear binding
force over generations.
A breach under political pressure can

403. In Italy there are cases against the communist resistant force concerning the
Ardeatine Quarries Massacre. See Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 861-64.
404. Kadribasic, supra note 108, at 132.
405. It seemed that both supporters and the opponents have not been satisfied with the
ways that the memory and legacy of Franco has been handled so far. Guy Hedgecoe,
Spanish Left Cold Over 'Franco in a fridge,' DW (Aug. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.dw.de/spanish-left-cold-over-franco-in-a-fridge/a-17029255 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
406. For a general discussion of internal principles oflaw see FULLER, supra note 8.

Published by SURFACE, 2014

73

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 4

112

Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 42:1

deconstruct mutual trust within the Spanish community. The idea that
promise must be kept is essential for the existence and dignity of all
human communities in the long run. This compromise or mutual trust
should not be broken to meet short-term political needs. Otherwise, law
is merely an instrument under the manipulation of politicians or the
masses. 407
Recently, Spanish law made a significant move in Garzon in which
law stayed away from political whim, 408 indicating that Spain now has a
firm democracy and rule of law. In similar political context, the Israeli
Supreme Court judged Szenes in favor of free speech, instead of being
motivated by the political consideration to promote Israeli identity for
state construction. 409 In this case, national identity represented by the
deceased heroine is of political importance to collective memory and
collective identity, but the defamatory threat is not high enough to
require more protection than free speech. The decision would have
been different before in the formative stage of the Israeli State, when the
Israeli law had played a significant role in state-construction and
identity establishment. As Bilsky noticed, this transformation period
lasted until the 1990s since the Zionist revolution, and many of the
constitutional moments involved transformation trials of a more
political nature. 410
In mature democracies, law is more independent from political
power and is strong enough to rebut the political need of history
censorship. Free speech rights are regarded as fundamental to a wellfunctioning democracy and are well protected by its constitution.
Furthermore, political states draw legitimacy from ballots, not from
history. Another notable reason that we see less censorship of history in
democracies is that in democracies, citizens are treated equally as
mature fellows, capable of making rational decisions themselves with
free access to information. A political state is not assumed to be in the
position to tell people what and what not to believe; which is contrary to
authoritarian states, where there is a paternalist approach to think on
behalf of subordinates. In addition, we have to note that democratic
communities are more tolerant due to multiculturalist nature,
407. For a discussion of the independence oflaw and rule of law in Modem state from
politics see PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW & SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW (1978).
408. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 176.
409. See generally HCJ 6126/94 Szenes v. Broadcasting Authority 53(3) PD 817
[ 1999] (Isr. ).
410. LEORA BILSKY, LAW, MEANING & VIOLENCE: TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE ISRAELI
IDENTITY ON TRIAL 7-10 (Univ. of Michigan Press 2004).
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recognizing and treating different cultures rather equally. 411
These are the reasons why most countries that have decriminalized
defamation are mature Western democracies. However, this is not to
say that rule of law and democracy, both respecting free speech as a
fundamental value, can eradicate potential history censorship even in
Western democracies. But, the non-protection of the dead's reputation
and dignity in common law countries can block history censorship as
justified by protection of the dead as a whole. Though the deceased's
living family may sue to protect their own interest affiliated with the
deceased, it offers no big chance to control information regarding the
dead in a more systematic way.
Protection of the dead' s dignitary interest by some continental law
countries, in contrast, leaves a legal avenue open for state interference
with history, even if such cases have to be waged by private parties.
The disproportional interference of free speech rights, discussed above
with respect to Pion, Mizzi, Lehideux, Kurzac, Gutierrez Suarez, etc.,
denotes possible history censorship, even by European democracies via
the protection of posthumous interests. Such cases, however, verify the
importance of a transnational court in securing free speech rights and
preventing state censorship of history. The critical role for the ECtHR
is to make decisions from a neutral position, away from the compelling
pressures of domestic politics, national identities, and cultural traditions.
The contribution of the Court, therefore, lies in its juridical authority to
bring difficult cases beyond the political and cultural limitations of
domestic laws to meet higher standards.
We have to understand that protection of the dead's dignity is a
well-justified end, since in many cultures the dead and their dignity are
important, and law has to protect the related interests both of the living
and the deceased. Law is a product of culture, and the values and
morals of a particular culture should be respected in pursuit of human
rights. The next section explains the reasons why reputations of the
dead are important in some cultures, but not in others, as well as the
resulting influence on law.
B. Law and Culture
The living law, Friedman said, "has its messages and functions ...
and one purpose is to protect the people who matter in society", and
such a protection "prevents society itself from severe structural

411.

CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF

RECOGNITION

27 (Amy Gutmann ed., 6th ed. 1994).
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damage."412 Whether reputation and dignity of the dead deserve legal
protection depends on a particular culture that defines social functions
of reputation in that community. Reputation in general, according to
Post, can be analyzed from the perspectives of honor, intangible
property and dignity. 413 Reputation, as personal, intangible property,
corresponds more to a community of individualist nature that
comprehends reputation as individual achievements on the free market.
In contrast, both the understandings of reputation as honor and as
dignity reside in communities of a more collective nature, though in
different ways. 414
The European continental laws represented by German law and
French law have been established on a similar base of a communitarian
or collective nature, stressing the value of human honor and dignity in
more hierarchal communities. 415 Reputation as honor has deep roots in
the two communities through their aristocratic traditions and has been
leveled up from privileged, minority social groups, to the concept of
mutual respects among all community members. 416 Actually, this kind
of honor in reputation represents individuals' social status in a
community that cannot be achieved by individual "effort and labor, [but
as] a right to it by virtue of the status with which society endows his
social role". 417 And "the loss of honor is a loss of status and personal
identity; the value of a good name 'ought to be more precious' than
life. " 418
This emphasis on honor has been reflected in insult laws and
memory laws that are popular in Europe, providing special protection
for reputation of special groups, although as in Germany, it is "a kind of
living fossil." 419 The emphasis on human dignity and honor in
412. FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 12.
413. Post, supra note 12, at 693 (discussion of the concept of reputation as honor,
personal property and dignity, which in the author's view co-exist in reputation but to
different extents).
414. Id. (though Post talked about common law countries, his analysis can be applied
to other communities equally).
415. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1284-85 (arguing that "the European culture of honor
and dignity reaches very deep into everyday social life, covering what to us seem
astoundingly trivial matters of civility" and describing "the dignitary cultures of civility that
reign in both France and Germany today and traces the sources of those cultures to old
traditions of social hierarchy."); see also Peled, supra note 79, at 779- 82 (arguing the
communitarian tradition in German defamation law).
416. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1384-90 ("a commitment to the broad distribution of
honor or dignity throughout society.").
417. Post, supra note 12, at 700.
418. Id. at 703.
419. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1314.
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European jurisdictions can be witnessed both in Article One of the
European Union Charter of Fundamental rights, and in the constitutions
of many European countries. 420 Protection of human dignity has been
recognized by the ECtHR in past judgments, 421 and the Court regards
human dignity as supporting other Convention rights. 422 Following
McCruden, "[h]uman dignity has also been incorporated judicially as a
general principle of European Community law, deriving from the
constitutional traditions common to Member States. " 423
Since honor and dignity refer to social status of individuals,
protection of the dead' s reputation is more comprehensible against such
legal-social backgrounds. The dead still need to be respected because
of dignity as past human beings, and because their social status previous
to death shall be cherished. As the German Constitutional Court
pointed out long ago in Mephisto, "the human dignity of the deceased
was of overriding constitutional value" and "it would be incompatible
with the constitutional command of the inviolability of human dignity,
if individuals could be freely disparaged after death." 424 In the decision,
as Brugger commented elsewhere, an apparent communitarian concept
could be found in German constitutional law. 425
A similar treatment can be found in the Israeli Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty in 1992. According to the Supreme Court of Israel,
the right of human dignity includes not only honor, but also reputation,
privacy and property, among others; 426 and both the right to reputation
and the freedom of speech are derived from the mother right of human

420. Rosier, supra note 77, at 170; see also Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of
Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 201, 216-17 (2008) (explaining Rao's
accounts of constitutional commitment to human dignity in Germany, France, South Africa,
and Canada, as well as in international laws).
421. First mentioned in Tyrer v United Kingdom by the Court, involving corporal
punishment, as against Article 3 protecting a person's dignity and physical integrity. See
Tyrer v United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, para. 33 (E. Ct. H.R. Apr. 25, 1978), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-57587 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
422. Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, para. 65 (E. Ct. H.R. July 29,
2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-60448 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014) (ruling "the very essence of the Convention is respect for human
dignity and human freedom); see also Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial
Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 655, 683-84 (2008) (discussing the
ECtHR's protection of human dignity).
423. McCrudden, supra note 423, at 683.
424. Rosier, supra note 77, at 177-78.
425. See Winfried Brugger, Communitarianism as the Social and Legal Theory Behind
the German Constitution, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 431, 433 (2004).
426. Peled, supra note 79, at 743-44.
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dignity. 427 In analyzing the jurisprudential foundations of Israeli
defamation law, Pe led noticed the moral influences of Jewish Law that
"attaches significant weight to the right of reputation and treats
defamation with great severity", and whose protection of the dead has
been absorbed by Israeli defamation law. 428
Peled found that the Jewish majority, as the dominating force in
shaping the country's culture and politics before late 1970s, "was
characterized . . . by communitarianism, collectivism and internal
solidarity." 429 He concluded that communitarianism and solidarity
parallel with each other with an ideology that values honor greatly and
limits freedom and liberty "in the name of moral commitment to
society", and demands individuals' compromise. 430 However after the
late 1970s, Peled noticed the Israeli law gradually witnessed a decline in
such collective and communitarian tendencies for a variety of
reasons. 431
We have to distinguish the two concepts of reputation which both
originated from such collective communities: reputation as honor and
reputation as dignity, which in Post's view refer to different things. 432
Reputation as honor concerns unequal social status in honor
communities with a deferential, hierarchical nature,433 while reputation
as dignity refers to equal social status of community members and equal
participation in communal issues. 434 According to Whitman, European
communities represented by France and Germany have leveled up the
protection of honor (reputation) of higher social classes to other social
classes after the Second World War, so that dignity and honor belong to
each member of a community. 435 In contrast, many societies protect the
dead's reputation more for the dead's honor and their related social
status. The stress is to secure social order and a hierarchical structure.
427. Id. at 748. It is worth of mentioning the plausible distinctions between
posthumous dignity and human dignity made by Antoon De Baets. See Antoon De Baets, A
Successful Utopia: The Doctrine of Human Dignity, 7 HISTOREIN 71 , 80- 82 (2007).
428. Peled, supra note 79, at 773.
429. Id. at 782-83 (pointing out three sources of the communitarianism before 1980s:
Jewish tradition, Jewish immigrants from European societies and Arab societies which
contained communitarian features, and the Zionist ideology with strong collectivist and
communitarian themes).
430. Id. at 783.
431. Id. at 787.
432. Post, supra note 12, at 715.
433. See BOWMAN, supra note 12 (discussing honor cultures and communities both in
the East and the West).
434. Post, supra note 12 at 715.
435. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1323, 1384 (In Whitman's terms: "an equal honor for
all" or "a minimum of honor for all.").
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Their laws have not yet shifted to the stage of protecting dignity of each
human being of equal status, including equally protecting dignity of the
deceased regardless of previous social status.
This doctrine is well explained in honor societies in which female
victims of rape crimes are dishonored even within their own families.
In communities where honor killings are popular, a woman's reputation
or honor belongs to her husband or her father, who regard her tragedy as
a big dishonor or disrespect of their incapacity to control or protect
her. 436 As David Pryce-Jones commented, honor acts as a kind of social
glue in a shame society and the acquisition of honor brings high status
to the individual and the avoidance of shame is a guarantee of low
status. 437 For John Davis, the essential character of honor is a system of
stratification, describing distribution of wealth, prescribing appropriate
behavior of people of various social positions, entailing the acceptance
of subordination and super-ordination. 438 Reputation as honor concerns
simply not only the individuals whose reputation is under direct
consideration, but also their families and relatives. Such an approach
influences social rules or civility norms in Post's terms. 439
In addition, attention shall be paid to the connection between honor
society and collective identity. At this point, honor of a state or a
particular racial group is collectively owned and appreciated, not
allowed to be degraded by others. The escalating negative attitudes of
many Russian authorities toward the Kytan tragedy, and the complaints
from the Polish families of the deceased victims can be explained by
changed political-cultural circumstances. Though Russia has been more
democratized in past years, the new regime still needs a new national
identity of self-pride and self-appreciation for unity. The overdisclosure of past massive murders of other peoples, as in the Katyn
tragedy, though commanded by a few communist leaders, is still a big
shame to the new identity. 44° From this perspective, it is easy to
436. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: How MORAL REVOLUTIONS
HAPPEN 18 (W. W. Norton & Co. 2010).
437. David Pryce-Jones, Shame and Honor, Terribly Twisted, NAT'L REV., (Apr. 21,
2003) (citing Bowman, supra note 12, at 27).
438. Post, supra note 12, at 700 (citing JOHN DAVIS, PEOPLE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN:
AN ESSAY IN COMPARATIVE SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 98 ( 1977)).
439. Id. at 710 (" ... when rules of deference and demeanor are embodied in speech,
and hence are subject to the law of defamation, I shall call them rules of civility.").
440. See Anne Garrels, Libel Case Sparks New Focus On Stalin's Reputation, NPR
(Sept.
8,
2009,
3:18
PM),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=l 12642329 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014); Andrew Osborn, Josef Stalin's Grandson Loses Legal Attempt at Rehabilitating
Soviet Dictator's Reputation, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 13, 2009, 8:29 PM), available at
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understand why a Russian historian was arrested when he invested the
fate of German soldiers imprisoned by Russian Security Services, 441 as
just part of a "' [p ]utinite campaign against freedom of historical
research and expression. "'442
In sharp contrast, communities of an individualist nature take
reputation as personal, achieved by personal efforts and labor. It can be
lost and regained on free market as personal, intangible property. An
individual can reconstruct his or her own reputation and therefore,
reputation is different from personal identity. 443 It is against this
cultural concept that the deceased have no legal protection of reputation
after death and their relatives and heirs cannot sue on their behalf to
benefit from other's good reputation. 444 The American approach to
reputation is a typical individualist one hatched in an individualist
culture. 445 The individualist approach can collapse or wear out the
collective nature of honor in reputation, given that free market and
democracy become the dominating aurae. Market economy will recalculate the value of personal reputation as products of personal efforts
and available for market exchange, while democracy requires equal
respect of individuals in participating public issues regardless of their
social status.
This explains the shift of reputation concept in many societies.
Since the late 1970s, for instance, Israeli society has witnessed the
decline of communitarianism, collectivism and solidarity and a
concurrent rise of individualism, at least among those people whose
influence on the character of the State of Israel is the greatest. 446
Among other factors, that the economic growth especially during the
1990s increased living standards - together with the process of the
Americanization - has strengthened individualism in Israeli community.
This has helped maintain a liberal majority in the Supreme Court to
attribute greater weight to freedom of speech and to embrace a liberal

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/6319755/Josef-Stalins-grandsonloses-legal-attempt-at-rehabilitating-Soviet-dictators-reputation.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
441.
Lydia Harding, Russian Historian Arrested in Clampdown on Stalin Era,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
15,
2009,
l :38PM),
available
at
http://www.guardian.co. uk/world/2009/oct/ 15/russia-gulag-historian-arrested (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
442. Id.
443. Post, supra note 12, at 700.
444. Iryami, supra note 19, at 1088.
445. See Bellah, supra note 35, at 743 ("Arguing that 'America is a culture that
focuses on the individual, a culture in which 'individualism' is a central value.").
446. Peled, supra note 79, at 787.
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interpretation of the constitutional protection of dignity. 447
In China, we observe a similar tendency. The rise of "a free
market" and capitalism has helped with prioritizing individual interests
in daily life after the 1980s, albeit collectivism is still the official
ideology.
Nowadays more people are likely to gauge other's
achievement (reputation) by economic achievements, and individualism
becomes the dominant morals than collectivism. 448 Reputation is not
only understood as honor denoting personal social status among the
Chinese, but more as the appreciation of personal economic
achievements and human dignity. 449 Moreover, the ordinary Chinese
have gradually recognized the economic interest in reputation and
privacy of the dead. 450 Therefore, even the ordinary Chinese start to
resort to law for protection. 451 The growth of individualism enriches the
understandings of reputation in China. And it motivates the Chinese to
speak out what they think about the past communist rulings and the late
political figures, which have caused many troubles. 452
It is in the communitarian culture that individuals are requested to
compromise their free expression right to protect the collective identity
or reputation, or human dignity for public interest. Laws of such
communities accordingly provide protection of posthumous reputation,
when reputation is more taken as either personal honor or individual
dignity. 453 While the emphasis on both concepts could be accepted by
447. Id. at 789- 90.
448. See Liza G. Steele & Scott M. Lynch, The Pursuit of Happiness in China:
Individualism, Collectivism, and Subjective Well-Being During China's Economic and
Social Transformation, Soc. INDICATORS Res. 442-51 (arguing that after decades' market
economy in China, Chinese people are increasingly prioritizing individualist factors in
assessments of their own happiness and life satisfaction, suggesting that Chinese society
becomes increasingly individualistic in social realities).
449. No wonder, the introduction of rule of law and the popularity of the idea of
human rights among the public play a role in promoting the idea of equality and dignity of
individuals. See id.
450. Many posthumous privacy cases are about the illegal appropriation of the dead's
likeness and the unconsented use of their names for commercial purposes. See Zhao, supra
note 349, at 298.
451. See Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation: An Empirical
Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47 HARV. INT'L L. J. 34, 103 (2006) (arguing
that the "increased use of defamation litigation by powerful parties in recent years may also
be encouraging more ordinary individuals to assert their rights" and "Permitting such cases
to be used to entrench local interests may be a necessary corollary or prerequisite to the
effective use of litigation by ordinary people.").
452. See Zhao, supra note 349, at 338.
453. At this point, I won't discuss Muslim communities, for which the collective
identity is of fundamental importance, in particular regarding the dead prophets and
religious leaders. See id.
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members of a society, it might be used as a good justification to limit
free speech of others. Eventually, this becomes a matter of balancing
different social interests by courts of law, which might lead to potential
chilling effects and history censorship.
It is better to conclude the discussion of the relationship between
culture difference, posthumous reputation protection, and legal
interference by quoting an observation of Rosler that "the conceptual
and cultural embedding is decisive. " 454

VIL CONCLUSION: DEAD BUT NOT FAR AWAY
This article has discussed the relationship between legal protection
of posthumous reputation and history censorship, explaining the
interplays of law, politics and culture that contribute to the complexity
of many posthumous defamation cases in different communities. On
the whole, the crux of the issue is how we shall treat the dead and their
posthumous interests, and how much compromise a community is
willing to make to protect the deceased? As discussed above, different
approaches can be interpreted by the characteristics of politics and
culture of a particular community.
Totalitarian and dictatorial states protect the dead's reputation, in
particular the reputation of political leaders, on the ground of their
social status, collective memory, and political legitimacy. Reputation
and honor of the dead therefore are important values to be protected by
their laws and free speech is usually compromised. It is also likely in
religious communities that strictly forbid defamation of religious
leaders and prophets. But, this is not to say that in Western democracies
there exists no history censorship or censorship of speech regarding the
past, or no official history or narrative is officially protected. We have
observed that in many circumstances speeches regarding dead leaders
and kings have been limited to different extents and some of which
were overturned by the ECtHR as violating the right to free speech.
This shows that free speech concerning the past may be restricted
sporadically for various reasons in Western democracies.
Other reasons include the protection of national honor or dignity
by preventing insults of state leaders, or protecting national identity.
However, the tendency in mature democracies is that there is no
systematic censorship of history, and that with the abolition of criminal
defamation, insult law and blasphemy law, there will be less violation of

454. Rosier, supra note 77, at 186.
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free speech rights of historians and journalists. Of course, the best
practice in this regard is from common law jurisdictions, whose strong
rejection of the protection of the dead's reputation and privacy has
erased the potential to abuse defamation law and privacy law for history
censorship.
This, however, does not mean that the strong tradition in some
European countries to respect and protect the dead's dignity shall not be
appreciated such as in German law and Maltese law. The point is that
there is a big danger to violate the proportionality principle when
balancing the posthumous protection with free speech right. Protection
of the right to free speech may yield under accumulating exigent public
needs and political whims, as seen in memory laws in Europe, opening
the door for future state censorship. The safest way is to walk far away
from the slippery water bank with a clear-cut line by resembling the
common law approach. 455 Even when protection of the dead's
reputation and dignity are regarded as highly important to a community,
courts of law shall make judgments in favor of free speech rights, unless
there exists real, compelling social needs, or the offense is grave and
serious enough to endanger the fundamental value of a society affiliated
with posthumous reputation and privacy.
To prevent potential history censorship under this avenue, judges
have to pay more attention to the following two issues: First, law is the
last means, but not the best to resolve history's controversies. Judges
are not well-equipped professional historians who can dig deep into the
dusts of history. Actually, historians themselves run into difficulties too
often in seeking historical truth (or facts). Though courts may dance
with politicians to achieve certain critical, political ends, such as
helping with the formation of Israeli state and Zionist identity, it should
be crystal clear that they must avoid such a political role and protect the
independence of law, so that law's authority and independency will not
melt down before prevailing political whims and public outcry.
Otherwise, what comes with the postponed suspicion of judicial truth
(or historical truth) offered in court is eventual distrust of the judiciary.
Therefore, second, when courts have to settle posthumous defamation
disputes regarding sensitive history, their discretion should be strictly
455. A reason why the author is against the recent proposal to protect the dead's
reputation by some law reform commissions in western democracies. See, e.g., Report On
The Civil Law Of Defamation, LAW REFORM COMM'N (1991), available at
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/rDefamation.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2014);
Death of a Good Name Defamation and the Deceased: A Consultation Paper, SCOTTISH
Gov'T, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/01/11092246/0 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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limited to decide whether the accused authors have sufficient evidence
to support controversial statements, and whether they have conducted
research according to acceptable academic manners.
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